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PREFACE 
This symposium is the Commission's way of commemorating the 
centenary of Jean Monnet's birth. 
One of the Commission's key roles is to record the history of 
European integration. This extends beyond institutional and legal 
developments to the individuals who have provided inspiration 
over the years. 
In his lifetime Jean Monnet took second place to the institutions 
he helped to create and subsequently guided. Today it is for those 
same institutions, in tribute to his memory, to highlight the 
circumstances in which they came into being and identify the 
influences which shaped the European venture. 
Anyone reading the proceedings of the symposium will be struck 
by the persistence of those influences. Two recent events, which 
feature prominently in these pages, are particularly good illustra-
tions of this. 
The first is adoption of the Single Act. The Single Act defines the 
goals of European integration by reference to the Treaty of Rome 
and overhauls decision-making procedures accordingly. But the 
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approach harks back to the Treaty of Paris establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community, instigated by Jean Monnet. 
The second is revival of the Action Committee for Europe, which 
intends to assume the mantle of Monnet's Action Committee for 
the United States of Europe. It was this committee that guided 
and consolidated the Community between 1955 and 1975, going 
well beyond its strict legal framework to provide vital political 
impetus. 
Both events demonstrate that Jean Monnet is still seen as a 
model. This symposium, which seeks to assess his varied legacy, is 
not just a trip down memory lane. On the contrary, its main 
purpose is to focus discussion on the future. 
Jacques DELORS 
President of the Commission 
of the European Communities 
I 
PROCEEDINGS OF SYMPOSIUM 

OPENING OF SYMPOSIUM BY 
MR LORENZO NATALI, 
Vice-President of the Commission 
of the European Communities 
Mr President, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
11 
One day last spring I came out of Jacques Delors' office in the 
Berlaymont. He had just given me the none-too-easy job of 
opening today's symposium, putting it in a somewhat peremptory 
way, which might sound rude to those who have yet to realize 
that a man with his breadth of vision is entitled to be brief. I 
turned into the long corridor leading to my office feeling more 
than usually troubled. Torn between pleasure and trepidation at 
the task facing me, I began to wonder ... 
How many kilometres have I walked along this corridor in the 
last 12 years as a professional 'tenant' of the 13th floor? How 
many people in the Berlaymont or elsewhere appreciate that this 
star-shaped building is a symbol of the Community, of a Europe 
embracing the four points of the compass, a Europe moving 
towards an ideal, a common centre? What would Jean Monnet-
Jean Monnet the philosopher-think of those who, at regular 
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intervals in the history of European integration, react to the 
apparent difficulty of working towards a common goal-the star 
image again-by suggesting that it might be easier for everyone to 
go their own way at their own pace? 
How would Monnet-Jean Monnet the man of action-quantify 
the time and distance separating the ideal Europe from the 
hard-won Community we know today? But if symbolism is not 
entirely fortuitous (as we in the warmer Mediterranean climes 
believe), and if the application of geometry to politics is not 
merely a formal exercise but a visual reflection of the need for a 
rational institutional order (an interpretation possibly dearer to 
the colder traditions of central and northern Europe), why shirk 
from making allowance for the time and distance represented by 
the toing and froing, the endless pendulum-like movement-
which would remind Umberto Eco of Foucault-of men and 
ideas along the corridors and four wings of the Berlaymont? 
There may have been those-Jean Monnet, the man of values, 
was not one of them-who imagined that the fact of building 
Europe from virtually nothing, or from rubble at best, would 
bridge the philosophical, cultural, idealistic, institutional, politi-
cal, social and economic gap between north, south, east and west, 
as quickly as technology can produce a scale reduction, a 
computer printout or a satellite photograph of ordinary physical 
distances. 
Our generation has been fortunate to have had a man of 
inspiration like Jean Monnet, who launched Europe on this first 
shared adventure. But what kind of Community do we want to 
find the day the scaffolding finally comes down? Only then will 
we be able to assess our architectural skills, to see whether there 
really is room for everybody (and for everybody's ideas). Then we 
can start hoping that the load-bearing structure-the institu-
tions-will withstand the test of time, that it will hold at least as 
long as it took Europeans to stop insisting on having their own 
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houses, or taking over their neighbours' houses, and build 
common institutions as an alternative to waging war. 
Do we want a Community rich in human diversity, encompassing 
different nations, a Community which respects their history, the 
pace at which they move and their plans for the future? Or do we 
want an artificial Community, tuned like an engine, blended like a 
convenience food, marketed like a broad spectrum product (and 
here you must either accept the rules of competition or bow to the 
laws of monopoly), a Community imposed by a faceless techno-
cracy on a continent so blinded by current advantages that it 
ignores the lessons of the past and fails to look beyond the year 
2000? In short, if we accept and apply Monnet's empirical 
yardstick, are we really guilty of Utopianism and crimes against 
realism vis-a-vis Europe and European history? What is the point 
of complaining about the pace of the Community bureaucracy as 
if it were a separate, sterile entity rather than the logical outcome 
of the blending of many systems and approaches, all of them 
equally plausible since they are all equally European? 
On the other hand, the Community process, like the human 
condition, is permanently caught between past and future, per-
sonal and social and some aspects, such as the collective will and 
collective needs, are gradually being effaced by individual, selfish 
demands. Was it not Jean Monnet himself-Jean Monnet the 
philosopher, Jean Monnet the man of action and values-who 
warned us against losing sight of the interrelation between men, 
ideas and institutions? This partnership is relatively new and it is 
in seeking to achieve this three-way balance-through mutual 
conviction and consensus-that the challenge of a single conti-
nental system emerges from the various democratic systems of 
Europe. 
Is this not the real issue which still fuels the transfer of sover-
eignty debate? Have people forgotten that Jean Monnet himself 
never spoke of the transfer of sovereignty but rather of the joint 
exercise of sovereignty? All I know is that we have only just 
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shaken off the ideological burden, that we are having trouble 
salvaging politics and political values from the resulting vacuum. 
Instead of adapting and modernizing Europe's democratic sys-
tems to cope with the 21st century, we seem to be hesitating and 
lagging behind. The pessimists are already predicting-not 
entirely without reason but their timing is wrong-that only the 
re-emergence of moral minorities can save Western democracy 
which, according to these diagnosticians, is suffering from stagna-
tion induced by pragmatic majority rule. 
I must admit that despite 12 years on the 13th floor of the 
Berlaymont, despite the progress I have witnessed or had a hand 
in, I find it difficult from this privileged if rather remote vantage 
point to say whether more could have been achieved more 
quickly. 
I am thinking of the 'instruction book' that Jean Monnet left us, 
of the patience and caution he advocated. I am thinking of Jean 
Monnet and his method, of the practical, even didactic, approach 
he chose in writing the new history of Europe commissioned by 
the founding fathers of our generation. Only Jean Monnet-with 
his method-could have calculated with any degree of accuracy 
what chapter we have now reached. Or perhaps he would merely 
have repeated to those of us who were still undecided that 
'resistance is proportional to the scale of the change one seeks to 
bring about. It is even the surest sign that change is on the 
way'. 
I had not come up with any conclusive answers to these complex 
issues by the time I finally reached my own office. Fortunately, 
however, the mental gymnastics I had performed on my way from 
one end of the Berlaymont to the other had put the worries 
sparked by Jacques Delors' request to the back of my mind. I had 
at least decided that the honour of opening today's symposium 
was mine because of my 'seniority'. I would therefore ask you to 
accept my years in the service of the Community as evidence of 
my desire-sincere, practical, modest but also determined-to 
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adhere faithfully to the code of conduct, the schedule inherited 
from Monnet. You can, if you like, interpret my 'seniority' as a 
humble but clear confirmation of the importance of this new task, 
this ambitious institutional venture which might never have been 
embarked upon-this is my personal impression-without the 
intervention of the great man we are honouring today. 
On this note I would like to thank all of you for accepting our 
invitation and being with us today. 
* 
* * 
Following this speech of Mr Lorenzo Natali, in his capacity as 
chairman of the round table on 'Jean Monnet's Method', called in 
turn on Mr Fran9ois Duchene, Mr Etienne Davignon, Mr 
Karl-Heinz Narjes, Mr Emile Noel and Mr Pierre Uri. 

Jean MONNET with Robert SCHUMAN, French Foreign Minister. 

A. JEAN MONNET'S METHOD 
1. REPORT BY MR FRAN<;OIS DUCHENE 
Professor at the University of Sussex 
19 
The method, or rather the approach, of Jean Monnet is at the 
heart of the paradoxes of his reputation. 
A minority of people who have followed events closely think of 
Monnet as one of the great figures of the 20th century. He has the 
quality enshrined in the epigraph, supposedly from 'Hamlet', 
which de Gaulle chose for his Edge of the Sword: 'To be great is 
to be identified with a great issue'. It is commonplace to compare 
and contrast de Gaulle and Monnet. In Paris, Monnet's ashes 
have been interred in the Pantheon. He is so far the one and only 
'honorary citizen' of Europe. 
Yet Monnet has been, and is, virtually unknown to the public. He 
was never elected by any constituency, he was never part of an 
elected government; one could almost say he never held the reins 
of power, as they are commonly understood. 
He also lacked virtually all the histrionic talents that matter so 
much in politics. His voice failed to carry. His rhetoric was, to say 
the least, austere. He studiously avoided all literary effects. He 
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had no instinct for projecting his personality in public. He was 
the classicist, the craftsman, who poured himself into his prod-
uct. 
A good civil servant can operate well enough within such limits. 
To succeed within them as a politician was a tour de force. 
In any case, like all major historic developments, European 
integration has been a collective achievement. To limit matters 
only to the political leaders of the early years, there are at least 
five characters in search of Europe of whom it can be said that, 
without their individual contributions, the Community as we 
know it might never have seen the light. Robert Schuman took 
the political responsibility, which could have turned against him, 
of the plan which bears his name. Konrad Adenauer was the rock 
on which the architects of Europe knew they could safely build. 
Paul-Henri Spaak, Jan Beyen and Guy Mollet also, at critical 
moments, played a decisive part. How, then, can Jean Monnet 
occupy the unique place he does in the Pantheon of contemporary 
Europe? 
The short and simple answer is that he invented the Community 
approach. 
This is true. It is also far too narrow. 
Monnet is one of the most fertile sources of political schemes this 
century. Between 1945 and 1963 (to speak only of these years) the 
Monnet Plan, the Schuman Plan, the European Army Project, 
Euratom, as strange as it may seem, the OECD, and finally the 
equal partnership between Europe and America, all bear in whole 
or part the marks of his inspiration. 
In practice, his impact has been even broader and deeper than 
this would suggest. Monnet exerted a ubiquitous influence on the 
spirit and the precepts of European unification; and no less on the 
strategy and tactics by which the Communities were carried into 
effect. 
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Robert Marjolin, in his memoirs, Le Travail d'une Vie, has given 
perhaps the pithiest explanation of this uncommon achievement. 
He wrote that Monnet 'had a power to persuade people which I 
have never encountered to the same degree in anybody else'. 
Monnet, he says, 'was absorbed at any given moment in his life 
by a single key idea, but it was not a limited idea; it was more 
often than not a view of the world. It was his exceptional ability 
to produce ideas that were original, or to which he at least gave 
the appearance of originality, combined with an extraordinary 
talent for putting them into practice, which basically explains the 
fascination Jean Monnet exerted on a substantial number of 
people coming from the most diverse backgrounds'. 
Basic values 
In high politics, the moving spirit is vital. If he had not had a 
vision rooted in universal values, Monnet would never have been 
able to give his specifically European proposals the power of a 
major idea, what the French can call an idee force. 
It has sometimes been said that Monnet was too much of a 
technocrat, and that his assumption that people could always be 
made to see reason was profoundly apolitical. This criticism is 
understandable. Although his goals were always political, Monnet 
was for a long time above all an organizer. And yet, from 1950 at 
the latest, this does not really seem to meet the case any more. 
Since the war, when people have talked of political values, they 
have usually meant the ideals springing from the French and 
Russian Revolutions, conflicts turning around social justice and 
equality. However, these presuppose well-established States and 
forms of political debate solidly rooted in law and custom. The 
international situation is situated a long way upstream from all 
this. It is much more reminiscent of feudal anarchy before 
absolute monarchies created the frameworks from which civil 
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debate gradually emerged. As at that stage in national histories, 
the international problem today is precisely how to replace chaos 
and abuse of power by the rule of law. On these questions, 
Monnet was impassioned, as were many of those who had lived 
through the wars and horrors of the earlier part of the century. 
In all Monnet's pronouncements, the central figure is peace. It is 
true there was a tactical element in this. It was necessary to parry 
the propaganda which claimed that European unity was an 
instrument of cold war. But his conviction went much deeper. It 
was the fruit of the two wars, and extended far beyond Europe. 
Monnet's characteristic idea that "we are not making a coalition 
of States, we are uniting men' knows no frontiers. 
Monnet detested what he called 'the spirit of domination'. In his 
memoirs, written for him by Fran<;ois Fontaine in a way which 
makes one think one can actually hear Monnet speaking, Monnet 
recalls an interview, at the time he was Deputy-Secretary of the 
League of Nations, with Raymond Poincare, the French Prime 
Minister at the time. Monnet and his colleagues had come to ask 
that limits should be set to the reparations payments which were 
fuelling German inflation and threatening the economic equilib-
rium of the whole of Europe. Poincare, puce with anger, refused 
categorically. It was precisely by reparations that he proposed to 
control Germany now and for a long time to come. He had no 
intention of giving them up. It was on that occasion, Monnet 
concluded, 'that I learned what the spirit of domination is'. 
What Monnet in his memoirs calls the 'method', is concerned 
above all with the psychological and political means of breaking 
the nationalist vicious circle of which Poincare's reaction was 
typical. 
For Monnet, equality was as important between nations as 
between individuals. For him, it was the basis of mutual confi-
dence, and therefore of community between people. 
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Naturally this was not automatic, and had to be given a shaping 
framework. Friendship, according to Monnet, is not the cause but 
the effect of a common outlook on the problem to be resolved. 
One must therefore fix a common goal and task, and organize 
them in such a way that everyone can rely on the system. 
The task in 1950 was the common organization of coal and steel, 
which were still at that time generally thought to be the sinews of 
war. Such an organization must be based on a global view of the 
general interest; demands rules which are equal and equitable for 
all; and implies joint responsibility for the partial losses which this 
or that member of the group may have to bear for the greater 
gain of the community as a whole. 
It is in order to implement these principles, not for abstract 
reasons, that there must be institutions with power to take the 
global view; to see that it really is taken into account in decisions; 
and to ensure that they are effectively applied. 
Monnet's view of the Community method was essentially psycho-
logical and political. It was not really constitutional, still less 
abstract. It did not depend on precedents, and not very much on 
books either. Monnet was suspicious of precedents and books. 
They lulled one's sense of the problem immediately under one's 
nose. 
Monnet gave life to the institutions which were set up on these 
principles by his behaviour as the first President of the High 
Authority of the first Community for Coal and Steel in Luxem-
bourg from 1952 till 1955. He introduced into the everyday 
language of the Communities a vocabulary, for instance words 
such as 'non-discrimination', which have become standard 'Euro-
pean' principles. 
During those years, Monnet laid the foundation of the European 
orthodoxy which still underlies, though sometimes at a consider-
able depth, the theory and practice of the Community. More than 
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doctrine, it meant instilling habits of behaviour. It is in large part 
because Monnet managed to embody such habits in his own 
person that he became the conscience of European integration. 
Strategy 
Spirit is vital, but the test of a policy is the ability to bring it 
down to earth in a strategy. 
Because the Communities have taken root, Monnet is often 
presented as a visionary. Assuredly he was, in the power of his 
imagination, and his ability to engender plans which exploited the 
potential in a situation. But what made Monnet special was not 
his vision as such. He was typical of a wide swathe of opinion 
after the war in his belief in the need for European unity. 
Similarly, if he was probably the first during the war, he was 
certainly not unique after the war, in thinking in general terms of 
a European approach to steel. Vision in this sense is not a 
particularly rare talent. What really marked Monnet out was his 
instinct and art in detecting where, when and how to launch the 
process and begin to implant the vision in the real world. It was 
here that he crossed the frontier between the man of vision and 
that much rarer phenomenon, the statesman. 
To know where to begin is the kernel of the Monnet approach. 
The point of departure is crisis. For Monnet, crises need not be 
catastrophes. On the contrary, they offer an opportunity, which is 
exceptional in political life, to generate demand for plans which 
bear in them the seed of new departures. He even wrote: 'I have 
always thought that Europe would be built up through crises, and 
that it would be the sum of the solutions brought to these crises'. 
A crisis is the dead end for routine. It is the moment when 
long-term choices impinge on political leaders as urgent dilem-
mas. In a crisis, politicians become anxious. They realize that 
routine no longer works. They are on the look-out for solutions. 
A crisis, then, is just the opportunity for someone who has the 
REPORT BY FRAN<;OIS DUCHENE 25 
specific imagination to draw from the contradictions of the 
situation the energy for a policy of change, and who has the 
daring to think through and accept its implications. At that 
moment, and no other, a creative reformer can change the whole 
course of policy. He can, and must, as Monnet said, 'change the 
context'. 
This is the meaning of the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. 
The post-disaster situation at the time demanded that the long-
standing rivalry between France and Germany should be over-
come. Both of them had to be committed to the common 
objective of European unity. But it was not possible to change 
everything at one step. As the central phrase of the Schuman 
Declaration put it: "Europe will not be united at a single stroke, 
nor by a predetermined grand design. It will come through 
practical achievements creating active bonds of community (soli-
darite de fait). 
This is essentially a dialectical view of politics. A new logic is 
injected into the traditional system. This first step demands that 
further ones be taken. Otherwise, the tensions between the new 
and the old regimes will become unmanageable. 
There have been times when one could wonder whether this 
dynamic was really that strong, but after nearly 40 years, 
Monnet's Pascalian wager seems to have succeeded. In theory, 
one could imagine an unwinding of the Community. In fact, this 
would be very difficult. An attempt to move back would revive 
old rivalries and tend to pose all the old problems the new policy 
has helped to overcome. This was clear, for instance after the 
failure of the European Army project. Further, to the extent that 
the new policy gathers powerful support, a built-in lobby for the 
new system is created. It may not at all times be strong enough to 
force further movement forward. But it nearly always is strong 
enough to prevent movement back. As a result, it has been 
possible on a number of occasions to make the new Communities 
mark time; it has never been possible to eradicate the power of 
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attraction of "European options' as the well-judged title of a book 
by Jacques Van Helmont calls them. 
To the extent that the analysis underpinning these European 
options is well founded, a moment sooner or later comes when 
the sense of the need to take further steps revives. 
The dynamic is therefore concrete and powerful. The only 
question, and it is still with us today, is to know whether it is as 
powerful as the forces for change in the outside world. On the 
other hand, it is precisely those forces which make Europeans 
move at all. One is beginning to lose count of the relances which 
despite all failures punctuate the unequal-but by the standards 
of history, still rapid-progress of the European Community. We 
are today in the middle of one of these phases of progress and 
hope. 
Nobody was more conscious than Monnet himself of the dialec-
tical nature of his strategy. He often used the metaphor, drawn 
from his long walks in the Alps, of the view which changes as one 
moves along the mountain path. 
For him, Europe obeyed the same principle. The daring, in 1950, 
only five years after the end of the war, of embarking on 
Franco-German reconciliation, required a broader Community 
including Italy and the Benelux countries. 11 years later, once the 
British were convinced that the Community was here to stay, and 
was likely to weigh more in world politics than the UK, they 
made up their minds to join. A European Community extended 
to include Britain at last had the political resources to become for 
the United States an 'equal partner'. (Note Monnet's constant 
preoccupation with equality.) 
These were the ideas promoted in 1961 and 1962 in the resolu-
tions of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, of 
which Monnet was the president and founder. They were taken 
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up by President Kennedy in his famous speech proposing a 
partnership of the United States of America and the uniting 
States of Europe. The aim was an association to promote the 
prosperity of the West and the development of the Third World. 
Monnet and the Action Committee, but not at that time Ken-
nedy, added the goal of establishing stable long-term relations 
with the Soviet Union. For Monnet, in short, Europe was the 
'ferment of change' of world politics. 
The Atlantic partnership was natural and logical. It allowed 
Europe to exploit as much as possible the effective political space 
it occupied between the two superpowers. Nevertheless, one can 
detect in it Monnet's basic pragmatism. 
There is little or nothing in the partnership idea of the prophet of 
Community institutions. What is proposed is bilateral relations 
between two continental entities. It is interdependence which 
cements the partnership, not institutions. Similarly, within Europe 
itself, it is striking that Monnet, the supposed functionalist, was 
always tempted by political union, even when it was less struc-
tured than the Communities themselves, and even when it was 
promoted by de Gaulle. He wanted to commit the governments to 
the system, and was ready to take risks in order to advance that 
commitment. 
Operations 
The pragmatism which typified Monnet's strategy was equally 
characteristic of his mode of operations from day to day. 
Because Monnet's activity was not always visible in public, there 
was a tendency to think of it as secretive and even Machiavellian. 
In fact, his approach was mysterious, indeed barely credible, not 
by deviousness but because of a simplicity which would have 
disqualified most people. All he did was to go straight to the 
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persons, known or unknown to the public, who could from near 
or far influence the decisions in which he was interested. On his 
way, he paid no attention to hierarchies, rank or appearances and 
by-passed them all. 
Obviously, it is not given to anyone to walk straight into the 
offices of the great, to persuade them, and to be 'simple' after 
such a fashion. It is only possible once a man has imposed himself 
in some way. Monnet managed to do this because for 40 years he 
had been going straight to the heart of the matter, and had shown 
the imagination to find the solutions that those around him were 
merely looking for. He provided an idea, a service, for those who 
needed it. 
Of course, to do that, one had to have the necessary practical 
imagination. It was one of Monnet's prime talents from the day, 
in 1914, when, at the age of 26 he persuaded the then French 
Prime Minister that the French and the British would really do 
better to get together to raise their war supplies in America and 
elsewhere, an unheard-of notion at that period. 
By the time of the Schuman Plan, he was already 61 years old. He 
had won his spurs in two wars and at the League of Nations. As 
Commissioner-General for the Modernization Plan in Paris, he 
exerted more influence than most of the members of the Govern-
ment. He had better international contacts, especially in America, 
than probably any other European. The hidden strength which 
sustained Monnet's activities was his virtuosity in the politics of 
the corridors where governments and bureaucracies meet. 
To impose himself by the quality of what he did, and not by his 
official jobs, implied a continuous search for the point at which 
effective action would determine all other priorities. It implied a 
capacity to concentrate on that, and on that alone. It also 
demanded an acute awareness of the relationships between the 
broad design and the implementing details, and those alone. 
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Monnet always managed to detach himself enough from the day 
to day routine to make sure of ordering his priorities. He walked 
every morning near his country home, and most of his major 
decisions came after a fortnight in the Alps. 
Once the general line had been fixed, a phase of intense discussion 
opened up. This could draw in people almost haphazardly. Paul 
Reuter, to whom Monnet first spoke of the Schuman Plan in 
1950, was one such visitor. So, at the end of 1954, was the 
American lawyer, Max Isenbergh, who inspired Monnet with 
enthusiasm for Euratom. Very soon the discussion would 
embrace his close associates, his small intellectual family which 
changed only very gradually. The partners in his process of 
discussion were chosen for the contribution they could bring, and 
neither for their official importance nor their age nor their 
nationality. 
The process could last days, sometimes weeks, and at times 
seemed to go round in circles while the successive versions of a 
scheme, a pronouncement or a speech were obsessively pol-
ished. 
This phase, however circuitous, was crucial. It was the guarantee 
of the quality of the product. Every facet of a problem, and above 
all the obstacles to be overcome, had to be fully grasped. The 
force and originality of the Monnet and Schuman Plans, to take 
only the archetypes, came largely from the way in which they 
circumvented the pitfalls which could have arisen from the 
acceptance of conventional wisdom. As in any product of quality, 
the art of these proposals can only be fully appreciated when they 
are examined in detail. 
In 1950, there were two major orthodoxies in Western Europe (at 
least in declaratory policies). One of them was planning, in 
countries where the political climate was more or less pink. The 
other was the market economy in the supposedly free-trading 
countries. The art of the Schuman Plan was to borrow from both, 
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but to avoid being confined by either, and to make it very 
difficult for outright opposition to mobilize from any angle. 
The fact that the ECSC was sectoral made it 'interventionist', but 
a common market which opened up the frontiers was free trading. 
The powers of the High Authority at times of crisis were 
'interventionist', but the anti-trust rules were free trading. Symp-
toms of such flexibility pervaded the whole system. 
Intense discussion was also needed to distil extremely simple 
conclusions. In fact, nothing could be more sophisticated than 
this because, as Pierre Uri has pointed out, 'it's not the problem 
that must be simplified, but the solution'. Some have indeed 
accused Monnet of simplifying the problem. But on the whole 
those who saw him recognized the practical force of the simplicity 
on which he always insisted. 
Well-selected simplicities helped Monnet convince himself, the 
better to convince those he was trying to enlist. They helped to 
avoid misunderstanding, and often made it possible to anticipate 
criticism in advance. Above all, they made it possible for Monnet 
to speak in the same terms to everyone, politicians, trade union-
ists, the press, and so on. Nationalism is paranoid almost by 
definition. To dissolve mistrust, one must be seen to address 
everyone in the same terms. Monnet succeeded to an extraordi-
nary degree. He himself said that to repeat untiringly ideas that 
seemed simple at least had the merit of disarming suspicion. 
In fact, simplicity really means distilling from confusion the basic 
priorities, and clearly accepting their implications. That was 
necessary for convincing governments. Monnet's networks of 
influence were legendary. Three prime ministers of the French 
Fourth Republic had previously worked for him, Rene Pleven as 
early as 1925, Rene Mayer in 1940 and in Algiers, Felix Gaillard 
at the Monnet Plan in 1945. In America, John Foster Dulles had 
been a friend since the League of Nations; John McCloy, the 
proconsul in Germany after the war, had been a close associate 
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since before the war; George Ball worked for Monnet for two 
decades before becoming Under-Secretary of State. All this 
without speaking of the numerous friendships in Germany, in 
Britain, in Italy, in the Benelux countries and in America, created 
by the European policy itself. 
There were also the friendly relations with the close subordinates 
of the powerful. These people were the artisans of the big 
decisions, and often people of great influence in their own right. 
They were first-rate sources of information, before and after the 
event. They were channels for passing ideas to the great without 
having to solicit. It was even possible to mobilize them to work in 
the good cause, a draft here, a conversation there, and so on. 
Many of these associates bear witness to the insidious charm 
Monnet could deploy. All these people of influence behind the 
scenes, as well as many far more junior, played a primary role in 
his networks and operations. 
Then came the phase of implementation. Etienne Hirsch has 
spoken of Monnet's 'determination to achieve results'. Monnet 
himself claimed never to have taken part in a meeting without 
having a paper ready, even if it was necessary to work late into 
the night. When he was well past 80, he was still astonishingly 
mobile, ready to travel at a moment's notice to advance his plans 
by an inch. He was never disheartened. According to Andre de 
Staercke, Jean Monnet and Paul-Henri Spaak got together the 
very day after the traumatic failure of the European Army project 
in order what should be done to regain the initiative. 
For all his dynamism and will-power, Monnet was usually ready 
to listen. Bernard Clappier and Etienne Hirsch have both under-
lined the crucial role in the success of the Monnet and Schuman 
Plans of working lunches where the food was passably spartan, 
but followed by the family cognac and Havana cigars. Max 
Kohnstamm has recalled the astonishment of hardened negotia-
tors at the beginning of the negotiations of the Schuman Plan, 
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when they saw Monnet, head of the French delegation, and his 
closest associates in open diagreement on the treaty under discus-
sion. Monnet already had a formidable reputation, and they smelt 
a trap. Once they had realized that it was actually a quite 
straightforward-but in a negotiation highly unconventional-
debate about the best solution, they became partners in common 
adventure, not to say crusade. The esprit de corps created by the 
Schuman Plan conference was to be of critical importance in 
European integration later, when most of the people who had 
been there played leading parts again. 
A model? 
In short, Monnet by the ideals he gave to the Communities from 
the outset, by his dialectical and dynamic strategy, and by his 
networks of influence throughout the West, had an impact the 
breadth and depth of which explains how he came very rapidly 
and in a lasting way somehow to embody the European ideal. 
When one surveys the most prominent figures of international 
policy since the war, as distinct from the outstanding national 
leaders, Monnet alone seems to stand at the fountainhead of a 
major policy as a real statesman. Not that he was lacking in 
national roots, Cognac and the rural France of his youth 
remained vivid in his personality to the end. But his outlook, 
which was not confined by national frontiers, his tentacular 
personal networks, his freedom from blinkers in assessing what 
individuals could contribute and not from where they came-all 
of these seemed to speak of the new international world that was 
emergtng. 
In these circumstances, it is natural to ask whether Jean Monnet, 
his methods, his modes of operation, have lessons to offer for a 
present and future where international forces increasingly hold 
sway. 
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The question is natural, but is nevertheless very difficult to 
answer satisfactorily. The idiosyncracies of the man and of his 
time are too specific. Monnet himself was exceptional. So was the 
climate of the time. The war had cleared the decks. That is not at 
all the condition of the contemporary world. Laying the bases of 
a Community, or proclaiming the Western partnership were one 
thing. Fulfilling their promise when the very progress of integra-
tion touches the vital nerves of society and State is quite another. 
This is evident in the intellectual reaction of the 1980s against the 
very idea of controls by governments, singly or together, over the 
operation of free markets raised almost to a sufficient condition 
in themselves. 
Yet the Community is alive and well as evidence of the force of 
the Monnet strategy and institutional vision. He would certainly 
have done everything he could to back the current efforts to 
complete the Community and give Europe, beyond 1992, new 
political potential. 
One could also look further afield. Take Monnet's favourite idea 
of the general view. 
We have already seen that it was the basis of his reasoning on the 
Community institutions. Once problems are posed to whole 
groups of countries, the individual States are powerless to provide 
the necessary solution. Each State is responsible to its own 
electors. It cannot be responsible for those of its neighbours. It 
must define advantage in terms of its own interests. 
Of course, when the costs of the resulting fragmentation of 
collective awareness become too great, the need for collective 
action may be admitted. But the risk is that action, when it 
comes, is too little and too late. 
In short, once the necessity for collective action is recognized, the 
need for a coherent response demands that an institution should 
be set up with the duty and the effective power to propose policies 
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in the light of the general interest of the members of the group. 
Today this idea has become familiar inside a uniting Europe. On 
the other hand, there is no notion of it all beyond the Commun-
ity. 
And yet, as one of the American friends and colleagues of Jean 
Monnet, Robert Bowie, pointed out yesterday, in the main 
amphitheatre of the Sorbonne, we are today on the threshold of a 
new phase in world politics. The cold war is beginning to fade. It 
is being replaced by the pressures of an interdependent world, 
which is full both of promise and of what are foreseeably 
immense problems. 
The world economy is more and more intertwined. Any solid 
system of peace between the West and Soviet regimes must, to be 
proof against upheaval, acquire structures that provide guaran-
tees and a framework with inherent power to grow and reinforce 
itself. As for environmental problems, if they become as acute as 
it may be wise to fear, policy will have to be freed from the 
anarchic competition of nation States. 
As societies become aware of the costs of international coopera-
tion based on nation States which resist a general view, one can 
expect the pressures to grow for solutions which must indeed be 
pragmatic but also much more radical than any which have been 
envisaged so far. 
In such a world, the Community method could prove, at least in 
some of its features, a model for other political solutions to the 
problems of complex interdependence. It is one of the inner riches 
of the European idea that it has been, and remains, ambiguous as 
between the creation of a united Europe for its own sake and the 
introduction of a new approach to world politics. This is a 
faithful reflection of Monnet's own attitude, which as his memo-
ries amply demonstrate, certainly sought to promote the United 
States of Europe, but also saw Europe as a 'ferment of change' in 
the world. 
2. ADDRESS BY MR ETIENNE DAVIGNON 
Vice-President of the Societe generale de Belgique 
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1. I think I owe my presence here today to the organizers' need 
for someone who did not have the privilege of working with Jean 
Monnet. I knew him, I met him with Paul-Henri Spaak. The 
relationship between Spaak and Monnet was clouded by Man-
net's frugality. Spaak used to say to me 'We are lunching with 
Jean Monnet, it'll be sole again'. 
2. However, I have been doing a great deal of thinking, which is 
only natural since the country to which I belong and which I 
served for some time, and the role I have been privileged to play 
within the Community, placed me willy-nilly in a situation in 
which aspirations of power were no more than a dream and could 
certainly not form a basis for action. 
This being the case, how can one see one's deeply-held convic-
tions transformed into reality? It seems to me that the merit of 
Monnet's method lay in allowing people to judge his beliefs for 
themselves since they could not be imposed by decree. Franc;ois 
Duchene has described and documented this in his excellent 
report. 
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3. But does the Monnet method still hold good today? After all, 
things have changed considerably since 1950, 1960 and 1970. 
For a start, we live in a society in which communication is 
essential, and the need is to persuade not those who govern but 
those who have to listen to them. This is something completely 
new. It places undue emphasis on the short term at the expense of 
the medium and long term. The constant need for explanation 
occasionally leads to talking for talking's sake. This makes people 
extraordinarily sceptical, a view reinforced by all the 'decisive 
conferences' and "last chances' which merely contradict each 
other. Moreover, when it comes to deciding what is needed and 
taking appropriate action we find that the situation has been 
exaggerated to such an extent that requirements are more difficult 
to identify than in the past. 
When all is said and done, it is difficult to believe in a crisis that 
we hear about as we awake each morning, if we can detect no 
difference when we go to bed that night. So, when it comes to 
taking action, we no longer have the incentive that would have 
come from a realization that the situation was critical and that 
something needed to be done. 
It is a little like having a book of, say, luncheon vouchers and 
simply throwing the vouchers away, despite the investment they 
represent, without making any attempt to redeem them. 
4. International relations have changed radically. I was struck 
by the fact that Fran<;ois Duchene's report made no mention of 
the remarkable boost European integration has received, not 
from the distant memory of the war, but from the fear of pressure 
from the East. Spaak always claimed that we should erect a statue 
to Stalin on Europe's behalf. Stalin is one of the founding fathers 
of Europe. I do not suppose it was what he had in mind, but it's a 
fact. What is the external federator today? There is none-we 
have only ourselves to rely on. 
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5. Having said that, I feel sure that the Monnet method, or the 
Community method as it is today, is the only way forward and, 
what is more, that progress is actually being made at this 
moment: 
(a) In the first place, there is no longer any scope for one 
European country to dominate another. 
(b) In the second place the countries of Europe can no longer 
argue among themselves in the belief that this will make them 
better off than before. If we look at the conflicts within the 
Community over the past 10 years, regardless of who initiated 
them, we can see that in very few cases did the country which 
decided to adopt a hard line achieve anything in the long run in 
terms of respect or the promotion of specific interests. It may well 
have secured a compromise which worked to its advantage on the 
specific issue which provoked the crisis but obtained no real 
benefit in terms of Community policy. A short-term gain was 
therefore achieved at the expense of an individual country's 
influence within the Community. 
(c) Thirdly, outside pressure today is being exerted, curiously 
enough, by the business world and market forces. That is another 
thought that struck me. Who would Monnet speak to today? I 
think he would talk to the people who, by their actions, are 
capable of anticipating the legal reality of the Community, that is 
to say a particular brand of businessmen and industrialists. That's 
who he would talk to. Not because of the power of money but 
because present circumstances have given these people an 
influence over events and the ability to change them. These are 
the people Monnet would talk to and it is my firm belief that this 
is how he would identify what needs to be done. 
6. The fact of the matter-if I may class myself with these 
businessmen and industrialists for a moment-is that no govern-
ment can provide us with the answers we need. We negotiate with 
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all governments, we invent words for this, methods for that, but 
at bottom, as Pierre Uri says, governments cannot offer us real 
solutions to complicated questions. So we look elsewhere. This is 
the Community's big opportunity, and it is very much to the 
advantage of the individual States, as Fran<;ois Duchene was 
saying, because the Community must maintain a low profile and 
accept that, while it may have wrought the change, it will be the 
Member States which enjoy the legacy and reap the benefits. 
This is what makes working in Brussels so demanding and 
stimulating. But it does demand a degree of self-effacement-
there are no medals going! And this, I believe, is a vital element 
of the Monnet theory. 
That is all I have to say, Mr Chairman. I will leave time for your 
other guests to speak, thereby demonstrating that I have no desire 
to domintate and proving that, at this level at least, I have 
understood Monnet's method. 

A meeting at the ECSC High Authority: 
Jean MONNET (centre) with Frans VINCK, 
Franz ETZEL, Albert COPPE, Pierre URI, 
Tony ROLLMANN and Dirk SPIERENBURG. 
Jean MONNET with Franz ETZEL 
3. MR KARL-HEINZ NARJES 
Vice-President of the Commission 
of the European Communities 
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1. After Franc;ois Duchene's excellent introduction to the dis-
cussion, I feel it is appropriate to begin with two preliminary 
remarks which are rather typically German. 
Jean Monnet was the promoter, indeed the originater of the idea 
that the Community was the right legal framework for relations 
between the various countries in the heart of Europe. The 
particular consequence for Germany was its readmittance on an 
equal footing into the family of free nations. We owe Monnet a 
debt of gratitude for that. 
It cannot have been easy for him to take such a step. In this 
context, it might be useful to draw a historical comparison. The 
Schuman Plan was announced five years-a mere 60 months-
after the end of the last world war. The situation five years after 
1918 was very different: 1923 saw Franco-German relations reach 
their lowest ebb in the history of the Weimar Republic, with the 
occupation of the Ruhr and the emergence of passive resistance. 
This comparison underlines not only the different situations 
prevailing after the two wars, but also the political vision of the 
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men of 9 May 1950. The gap between 1945 and 1950 was very 
short, in any event shorter than the time we have allowed today 
between entry into force of the Single Act and completion of the 
internal market. These figures illustrate perhaps better than 
anything else how courageous, realistic and constructive Monnet 
was in his actions and his advice. 
2. My second preliminary remark concerns the indirect 
influence which Monnet had on post-war domestic politics in 
Germany. This was felt in all three major parties. It was thanks to 
him that the majority of the SPD, which was originally opposed 
to European integration-Europeans like Wilhelm Kayser, Max 
Brauer and Georg Zinn were in a minority-overcame its scepti-
cism. In the CDU and the FDP, there was considerable opposi-
tion from the champions of the market economy. First, Ludwig 
Erhard had to be won over to the idea of integretion. This was 
made possible not least thanks to Monnet's particular support 
for, and defence of, the work of three men, Franz Etzel, Hans von 
der Groben and Alfred Miiller-Armack (to name the most 
prominent figures). Through his dealings with the German Trade 
Union Federation too, he helped ensure that social consensus in 
post-war Germany was not undermined, but rather strengthened, 
by outside influences. 
3. My next point is really a continuation of a remark made by 
Fran~ois Duchene on relations between Europe and the United 
States. The partnership of equals, and I stress the word 'equals', 
has been the only constructive and lasting idea to emerge on the 
future shape of transatlantic relations. I hasten to add that it has 
so far failed to materialize, because Europe has not been prepared 
to take on the burdens which are an inevitable part of responsi-
bility. But the Americans too have found it difficult to get used to 
the idea of Europe as an equal partner. Nevertheless, partnership 
continues to be the only feasible option, and Europe should look 
for ways of acting upon this as soon as possible and assuming the 
responsibilities involved. 
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But I would also stress the enormous difference between the 
self-confident America of 1950, with the personalities referred to 
by FranQois Duchene, like Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles 
and George Ball, but also figures such as David Bruce and Jack 
McCloy, and today's rather pathetic 'Fortress Europe' cam-
paign. 
4. My fourth point concerns the institutions. FranQois Duchene 
quite rightly emphasized the strength of Monnet's commitment to 
developing the Community institutions. With particular reference 
to my discussions with Walter Hallstein on the subject of Monnet, 
I would once again stress to what extent the desire for peace in 
Europe, and the search for instruments which would rule out war 
in Europe for all time, determined the course of the Treaty 
negotiations. A basic consideration, and quite rightly so, was the 
fact that, in the 19th and 20th centuries, all the instruments of 
international law had been tried by history and found wanting. 
Instruments such as the German Confederation, the Holy 
Alliance, the Concerto of Europe or the systems of collective 
security, had all failed the acid test of preserving peace. This was 
one of the essential reasons for opting for a Community as an 
instrument of integration, in order to internalize what had 
previously been external conflicts, in other words to treat them as 
domestic issues and attempt to resolve them within an institu-
tional framework. It is precisely because of the need to guarantee 
peace that it is so important to maintain a clear commitment to 
the institutional process and not to question it in any conceivable 
circumstances. 
5. An institutional system of this kind, designed to ensure peace, 
cannot afford to be dominated by one set of interests. This would 
be incompatible with the notions of democracy and equality, and 
this in itself is a reason why it would be unthinkable for a 
European constitution to be based on any form of hegemony. On 
the contrary, Europe's self-determination should be assured by 
means of a democratic constitution based on formal agreement. 
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The decisive test of self-determination is arguably the ability to 
take action in the world arena in times of crisis. Monnet 
constantly stressed that, while the Treaties of Rome provided the 
Community with some very useful pointers to help it on its way, 
the time comes when the Community must take all its decisions 
independently, in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the 
time. Once this stage is reached, the founders of the Community, 
the authors of the Treaties, can hardly offer any further assistance 
beyond the aims which they laid down in the Treaties. While 
individual personalites may set such a process in motion, it is up 
to the new institutions to ensure that it is sustained. 
This implies, in my opinion, that we should not accept any 
compromises or take any risks where the institutions are con-
cerned, even in the event of enlargement. If it is to strengthen the 
Community, enlargement cannot be allowed to undermine the 
institutional system-to think otherwise would be to betray 
Monnefs concept. 
6. In yesterday's Le Monde, Paul Delouvrier raised the very 
interesting question of the extent of the differences between 
Monnet and de Gaulle. It reminded me of the three conditions 
which de Gaulle laid down for drafting a constitution: efficacite, 
stabilite and continuite. My conclusion is that Monnefs concept 
of the Community came appreciably closer to meeting those 
conditions than the concept to which de Gaulle himself adhered 
in his lifetime in relation to the founding of the Community of 
Six. This also applies, in the context of the present discussions on 
the Europe of tomorrow, to all the accusations directed against 
Europe's 'monstrous regiment', supposedly made up of Eurocrats, 
technocrats, soulless centralists, bureaucrats, champions of diri-
gisme, interventionists, stateless persons, or whatever. Any con-
cept for a Community constitution must first of all pass the peace 
test, and then the test as to whether it guarantees Europe's 
self-determination. None of the more recent critiques I have come 
across has satisfied both these criteria. 
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7. I would like to conclude by recalling Walter Hallstein's 
report of a conversation with Jean Monnet during the negotia-
tions in the early 1950s about the time needed to build a federal 
Europe. Both men seem to have come to the conclusion that it 
would probably take a generation. Assuming that a generation js 
40 years, we might therefore expect to be reaching the goal in the 
1990s. If we take this as our reference, we have fallen somewhat 
behind schedule. However, it is my opinion that the European 
democrats in the Community have passed a severe test by 
contriving, over a period of 40 years, to maintain the continuity 
of the European idea and of European integration, regardless of 
domestic political circumstances and of the tendencies and 
influences of the moment in domestic and foreign policies, and in 
economic and social policy. Some Member States must have had 
30 governments in that time, and not one of them has challenged 
the basic principle of participation in the process of European 
integration. This is an achievement which should not be underes-
timated, one which should give us the courage to pursue our 
efforts with as much consistency-and, if necessary, stubborn-
ness-as has been displayed in the 38 years since 1950. 
8. We are, however, a little behind schedule. So there is no time 
to lose, if-as somebody mentioned in Paris yesterday-we are to 
keep pace with worldwide developments. We are on the threshold 
of a new century, and must prepare ourselves for its political 
realities and challenges, a century in which the change in power 
relations will be to the clear disadvantage of the two present 
superpowers. Henry Kissinger was quite right to describe the 
shifting trend in the balance of power since the war as irreversi-
ble. We must adapt to that fact, and prepare to make a decisive 
contribution to peace in a world with a population of nine or 
10 billion. This is another reason why I believe that the finalite 
politique of European union must become a reality no later than 
the year 2000. After the internal market in 1992 it is the next big 
milestone on the road to integration. By then we will have only 
eight years left. 
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4. MR EMILE NOEL 
Principal of the European University Institute and 
Honorary Secretary-General of the 
Commission of the European Communities 
1. Fran<;ois Duchene quite rightly spoke about Jean Monnet's 
approach rather than Jean Monnet's method, recognizing that the 
use of the term 'method' could give rise to confusion. There is no 
doubt that what we are talking about is an approach, based on a 
number of guiding principles which Monnet developed in the long 
lead-up to his more immediate involvement in European affairs. 
2. The Community's new lease of life invites comparisons 
between recent events and what was achieved in the 1950s, when 
the Community was launched. What I would like to do is 
pinpoint some features of the present revival and draw such 
parallels as may exist between the approach adopted since 1985 
and Monnet's approach in the 1950s. 
3. I would begin by observing that the impetus for the revival in 
1985-86 was provided by the combination of an economic pro-
ject-creation of a single European market by the end of 1992-
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and an institutional project-negotiation of the Single European 
Act. Let us cast our minds back for a moment to 1984. The 
Fontainebleau European Council had temporarily patched up the 
family quarrel but the Community and its institutions emerged 
from the 1979-84 crisis considerably weakened, lacking overall 
direction, and facing a profoundly sceptical public. 
4. It was against this background that the Delors Commission, 
which had just taken office, proposed an ambitious medium-term 
project: creation of a single European market by 1992. The 
following June the Milan European Council was asked to pron-
ounce on this project and on the proposal to convene an 
intergovernmental conference to revise the Treaties of Rome and 
strengthen the role of the institutions. 
What are we to make of this new factor in the European 
equation? The single market is a European programme devised to 
serve the common interest. It must be implemented in full if it is 
to bear fruit and bring advantages to all. Negotiation of the 
Single Act should serve to strengthen the institutions-Parliament 
and the Commission-which articulate the common interest and 
make the functioning of the Council more flexible, thereby 
creating the conditions in which the single market can be 
discussed from a European viewpoint rather than provoking 
conflicting national interests. 
Surely this combination of initiatives mirrors the approach 
adopted by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman in 1950, when 
they launched the idea of a Coal and Steel Community, and 
subsequently opened negotiations on what was to become the 
Treaty of Paris. 
The negotiations were to be conducted on the basis of the 9 May 
declaration. All participants were asked to endorse the principles 
of that declaration, in other words to adopt a European view-
point. As Fran<;ois Duchene recalled just now, the negotiations 
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were designed to serve the European interest rather than produce 
a compromise between national positions. The declared objective 
was of great political importance~ namely to set up a common 
structure for the production of coal and steel-at that time the 
basis of industrial power-and to open up the longer-term 
prospect of constructing a federal Europe. Finally, Monnet and 
Schuman proposed the creation of common institutions, institu-
tions which still exist 40 years on~ to represent and defend the 
European interest. 
The need to make proposals, to negotiate, to act solely in the 
European interest and to enshrine that interest in permanent 
institutions, was one of Monnet's guiding principles. And it was 
this same principle that underpinned the first moves towards the 
current revival in Europe. 
5. After the breakthrough in 1985, the movement seemed to lose 
momentum. The Community's resources were exhausted once 
again, agricultural production and expenditure were rocketing, 
and the less-prosperous Community countries wondered whether 
the commitment to greater economic and social cohesion 
enshrined in the Single Act would in fact be honoured. To make 
matters worse, there was open confrontation between the Twelve 
on all of these issues, so that complete deadlock appeared to have 
been reached. 
Something had to be done. In February 1987, in a memorandum 
entitled 'Making a Success of the Single Act', the Commission 
studied the entire range of issues, not individually but in the 
broader context of honouring the undertakings given in the Single 
Act, namely to complete the internal market and achieve greater 
economic and social cohesion, leading to the transformation of 
the Community into an economic and social area. On this basis a 
precise, detailed programme was drawn up to achieve the objec-
tives laid down in the Single Act. Fallowing a year of negotia-
tions, this programme was adopted virtually in its entirety by the 
Brussels European Council in February 1988. 
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6. One cannot but be struck by the similarities between the 
present Commission's approach and one of Monnet's guiding 
principles referred to earlier by Fran~ois Duchene, namely the 
importance of being able to place an apparently insoluble prob-
lem in a totally different context and thus bring new elements to 
bear upon it. This is precisely what Monnet did in 1950 when he 
made his major contribution to solving the two most serious 
problems facing post-war Europe: liberation of the German 
economy, heavy industry in particular, and the German contribu-
tion to Western defence. 
Although it was important to exploit Germany's potential to 
contribute to security and prosperity in Europe, there had to be 
guarantees for Germany's recent victims. And care had to be 
taken not to repeat the mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles, which 
had discriminated against Germany. A problem that appeared 
intractable at bilateral or intergovernmental level was suddenly 
solved when placed in a European or Community context where 
the expansion and control of coal and steel production and the 
organization and training of the armed forces could be based on 
common rules and placed under the authority of common institu-
tions. 
Another of Monnet's guiding principles was to change the context 
of an issue by adding another dimension. This principle too was 
successfully applied-with the help of a stubbornness in negotia-
tions similar to that displayed at times by Monnet-during the 
second phase of the revitalization process, which culminated in the 
Brussels European Council. 
7. This revival, as has been said again and again, is not an end, 
but a beginning. It has set a process in motion and provided the 
impetus for further discussion, brilliantly illustrated by the 
Hanover European Council, which identified economic and mon-
etary union as an objective. 
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The Single Act, by setting the Community and its Member States 
the twin goals of creating a single European market and achieving 
greater economic and social cohesion, had already laid the 
foundations for progress by establishing a dynamic link between 
the measures designed to achieve those two objectives. The 
package deal approach which dominated the Community for 20 
years has been replaced by a forward-looking strategy. 
8. Does this not echo another of Monnet's guiding principles? 
Monnet always strove to take a sufficiently important starting 
point as the basis for action, so that the momentum, once 
gathered, would be sustained. To ensure the survival of the Coal 
and Steel Community further progress was necessary. Its very 
existence engendered a dynamism, what might be termed a 
dynamic imbalance. This is why the plans for a defence Commun-
ity and a political Community came into being, perhaps prema-
turely. This is why, at a later and more timely juncture, these 
plans were superseded by the Treaties of Rome establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community and the European Eco-
nomic Community. 
The processes triggered by the Single Act represent a more 
advanced, more sophisticated phase in the Community's progress. 
Today the institutions have more scope to act in the economic 
and political fields, but the inspiration is the same: implementa-
tion of a forward-looking strategy. So here we have another of 
Monnet's guiding principles which seems set to preside over the 
third phase of Europe's revival. 
9. Given the limited time available, I will simply make these 
three points to illustrate what to my mind are striking parallels 
between the ideas which inspired Monnet and the strategy of the 
new generation of European leaders, parallels which, I believe, 
highlight the modernity of Monnet's thinking and the continued 
topicality of his approach. 
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5. MR PIERRE URI 
Winner of the Robert Schuman Prize 
After such a wide-ranging speech as the one we have just heard 
from Fran9ois Duchene, and the wealth of comments from others 
who worked with Jean Monnet, what is there left for me to say? 
Perhaps I can just betray a few confidences which are no longer 
covered by the 30-year rule. 
When I hear people talking about Jean Monnet's method, I 
always have a feeling that there is an ambiguity. Does it mean his 
personal contribution to events? Does it mean the original edifice 
he constructed, copying nothing from earlier federations, the 
combination of an independent body and government representa-
tives, the dual executive which makes European integration so 
special? Or does it mean the hidden ways in which he brought his 
influence to bear? 
Monnet is not as well known as he should be. Some people 
confuse him with the painter, despite a different Christian name 
and the extra 'n'. When all is said and done, they were not in the 
same business. The fact is that Monnet chose to turn his back on 
fame because he preferred to influence events. There were things 
which he found intolerable-conflicts of course-but also the 
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failure of people who should have been on the same team to pull 
together. Hence his efforts to organize cooperation between 
France and the United Kingdom as early as the First World War 
and again during the Second. He used to say to me: •y ou know, 
the reason people listen to me is that they know I don't want to 
take anybody else's place'. That is why he opted to learn to serve 
others throught his gift and his taste for persuasion. 
People say he was not a media-oriented figure. Do not forget that 
in his day the media did not play the part they do today. 
Remember that there were no mini-cassettes and that nothing 
whatever remains of various turning-point conversations or 
speeches. I know from my own experience that Monnet was 
extremely good at using newspaper journalists. He knew perfectly 
well how to talk to them. 
But it was when it came to approaching powerful men that he 
was truly remarkable. We have heard how, at the age of 26, he 
sought out Viviani. We know that he was so international that 
after the defeat of France he turned up as a member of the British 
delegation in Washington, thereby gaining access to Roosevelt 
and contributing to the Victory Program. I may well be betraying 
a confidence when I tell you that he told me that one day 
Adenauer asked him to attend a meeting of the German Govern-
ment. 
There is another thing I should like Michel Debre to know. When 
de Gaulle, who had poured scorn on what he called the coal and 
steel hotch-potch, returned to power, he decided, with some 
apprehension, to approach Adenauer and realized that an under-
standing could be reached. With the benefit of hindsight we, of 
course, can clearly see how the Schuman Plan transformed 
French and German attitudes. After talking to Adenauer, de 
Gaulle received Monnet at the Elysee and admitted: 'I underesti-
mated the political importance of what had been achieved'. 
Another hallmark of Monnet's method, in the sense of his 
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personal contribution, was teamwork. Monnet, unlike so many 
other people, was a man who was never resented by his staff, a 
man who did not see them as rivals. On the contrary, he knew 
how to trust them. As I am sure both Paul Delouvrier and 
Fran9ois Fontaine would confirm, Monnet used to say to us: 
'You know much more about this than I do. You just go ahead 
and don't even bother to report back to me'. I cannot think of a 
better way of inspiring boundless devotion and inducing people to 
work impossible hours. There were no such things as holidays or 
weekends; you had hardly left the building when you were called 
back. The same spirit spread to our own people. I remember 
being sent eight secretaries one Sunday. I remember people 
working with me who never had a weekend off. I remember, 
when we were involved in the Spaak report, how hard the 
secretaries worked until late at night. I once said to Monnet with 
a laugh: 'You used to exploit us, but no one held it against you'. 
He also had a way, you see, of taking an interest in the personal 
problems of the people working with him. 
People also talk about Monnet's patience and the time it often 
takes to effect change. This does not mean that he liked the 
step-by-step approach-quite the reverse. Things tended to hap-
pen in dramatic leaps and bounds. Look at the ECSC, the 
Schuman Declaration. A mere five years after the end of the 
worst war and the most appalling period of occupation, people 
were suddenly saying that the first priority was to bring France 
and Germany together under a joint high authority open to 
cooperation by other countries. That dramatic gesture changed 
everything. The fact that it then took patience to set it all up is 
another matter. Then there was Euratom. Why did he opt for 
Euratom? It was because the atom bomb, with its devastating 
entry onto the world stage, not only fired the imagination of the 
nations of the world but also marked the beginning of a new 
industrial revolution. 
The notion underlying everything Monnet did was that we need 
institutions because institutions can be improved and can hand 
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wisdom down from generation to generation. There are never 
unsupported edifices, they always have a solid substructure and 
they have a mission. There were already economic problems when 
the Coal and Steel Community was set up: the inflexibility of the 
deep-mine production process in the case of coal and over-
sensitivity to economic fluctuations and variations in investment 
patterns in the case of steel. 
Monnet's method was to identify the point at which action was 
needed, to focus on the essential, the anchoring point-! am 
always tempted to say the Ansatzpunkt, if Karl-Heinz Narjes will 
bear with me, since this is the best term I can think of to express 
what Monnet's work amounted to-and the rest would follow of 
its own accord. 
There are people who think that Monnet was only interested in 
sectoral integration-! was rather shocked when I read this in a 
newspaper. I telephoned the writer of the article in some 
annoyance and said to him: 'Have you never read the Schuman 
Declaration? It talks about federation. Have you never heard of 
the Action Committee for the United States of Europe?' A 
distinction has to be made between aims and tactics. The reason 
Monnet delegated so much to the people who worked with him 
was that he knew that he had something else to offer-an 
extraordinary intuition for what would have to be done in the 
near future, combined with a feel for what might be premature 
and ought therefore to be held in reserve. If he was hesitant about 
the common market-extremely European-minded friends like 
Bernard Clappier used to say to me: "You must be dreaming, 
France will never agree to that!'-it may have been because, after 
the failure of the EDC, Monnet was afraid of overloading the 
ship, afraid that, by trying to press ahead with plans for Euratom 
and the common market at one and the same time, we would end 
up with neither. In the event everything went through, because 
people's attitudes changed. The conjunction of two tragedies-
Suez and Budapest-proved to be the catalyst. The French 
suddenly realized that even with the United Kingdom they were 
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not a major force in world affairs and that the only way of 
counterbalancing the big powers was to create a larger struc-
ture. 
There was, too, the new way of looking at things referred to 
earlier. Neither the Plan nor European integration could ignore 
the market, but there are things which the market cannot solve 
unaided. Market forces will not direct investment towards the 
poorer countries with no infrastructure of any kind. We know 
that state intervention creates distortions which have to be 
corrected. We know that if we are to win full cooperation from 
workers, which is probably the best way of achieving the highest 
level of productivity, we need to shelter them from the hazards of 
progress. Hence the idea of redevelopment. There has to be a 
balance between the regions, or to use the current phrase, there 
has to be economic and social cohesion. 
These, then, are the ideas and the methods which enabled us to 
create something which is not, as malicious tongues would have 
it, 'an American Europe' but rather a Europe capable of talking 
to America on equal terms. It seems to me that what we are 
seeing today is a Western Europe which, thanks to its organiza-
tion and its policy objectives, is actually beginning to attract the 
countries of Eastern Europe, who have recognized how efficient 
our combination of freedom of initiative and policies regulating 
the activities of individual firms can be. 
We are often asked, in the spirit of Monnet, what the Community 
should be doing today. I know people talk quite a lot about 
currency. It is not as simple as all that. It is not, I would say in 
passing, just a matter for the central banks. Currency raises 
budgetary and fiscal questions and it also implies an Incomes 
policy. Then people talk a lot about technology. 
Obviously the part played by coal and steel 40 years ago now 
devolves on the high-technology industries that will shape our 
future. And then there is culture, particularly now that it comes 
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to us through the audio-visual media. These are now at a turning 
point where they might very well go into a steady decline or, 
alternatively, turn into a wonderful instrument for communica-
tion between the countries of Europe. 
I myself would suggest other ambitions. As I said earlier, Monnet 
could not tolerate conflicts which had embroiled the world in 
bloodshed or misunderstandings between people whose interests 
were the same. I think that we should exploit a proven method of 
negotiation and the role of the European institutions. People 
must never be allowed to face each other head-on in negotiations; 
that just leads to mounting misunderstanding and suspicion. We 
should have wider recourse to mediators or go-betweens, to use 
Losey's term, people who have the trust of both sides and the 
imagination to find solutions which are not simply compromises 
where you take 30°/o of what one side wants and 40°/o of what the 
other side wants and forget about the rest. Synthesis, in the 
chemical sense of the term, where the end product is different 
from its components, is quite another matter. Given the speed of 
change and innovation and the emergence of new technologies all 
over the world, I feel that this method of negotiation should 
become standard practice, not only between countries but also 
inside firms. People must come to understand that command is no 
longer a matter of handing down orders through a hierarchy. 
Command is a network of skills, a synthesis, a dialogue with 
those who are actually doing the job. The method that Monnet 
introduced into international relations applies equally to company 
management. Dare I suggest that the first people to understand 
this were the Japanese? 
There is a second guiding principle that can help Europe to carry 
out its allotted task in the spirit of its founder: in today's troubled 
world we are not building Europe for Europe alone. Our lesson to 
others is that the fiercer the ravages of conflict between nations 
the greater the need for even closer ties in peace. This is what has 
happened in the case of France and Germany. I do not believe 
there will be any solution to the Middle East problem until a 
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community is created there with a federal capital, obviously 
Jerusalem. The same approach must be used to overcome con-
flicts in Asia and tribal struggles in Africa. This would be a way 
of responding to the ideas of the man we are honouring here 
today. We are not in the business of building Europe so that 
Europeans can be stronger and happier. We are building Europe 
so that it can become a decisive factor for democracy and 
peace. 
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6. CLOSURE OF THE MORNING SESSION 
BY MR LORENZO NATALI 
Vice-President of the Commission 
of the European Communities 
I am sure I speak for all of you in thanking Fran9ois Duchene, 
Karl-Heinz Narjes, Etienne Davignon, Emile Noel and Pierre Uri 
for their contribution to this morning's session. The reports and 
the round-table discussion served not only to jog our memories, 
but also to put the public spotlight on the man we are honouring 
today. 
There is one point worth mentioning. Everyone who spoke this 
morning referred, quite rightly, to the fact that Jean Monnet is 
relatively unknown. Today's symposium was organized not 
simply to pay tribute to Monnet's memory, but also to publicize 
his philosophy. I believe that we must continue to highlight our 
aims and objectives in all we do. We must never forget why Jean 
Monnet, in forging a link between an idea, a concept and its 
practical implementation, succeeded in creating the living reality 
that we are experiencing today. 
Round table, morning session, from left to right: 
Emile NOEL, Etienne DAVIGNON, Lorenzo NATALI, 
Karl-Heinz NARJES, Fran9ois DUCHENE and Pierre URI. 
A section of the audience. 
Round table, afternoon session, from left to right: 
Max KOHNSTAMM, Karl CARSTENS, David F. WILLIAMSON, 
Jacques CHABAN-DELMAS, Pascal FONTAINE and Jacques DELORS. 
A section of the audience. 
Round table, afternoon session, from left to right: 
Karl CARSTENS, David F. WILLIAMSON, Jacques CHABAN-DALMAS, 
Pascal FONTAINE and Jacques DELORS. 
From left to right: 
ran co-Maria MALF ATTI 
and Lorenzo NAT ALI. 
Jacques DELORS with Jean MONNET's daughter and son-in-law, 
Mr and Mrs SARRADET-MONNET. 
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B. ACTION COMMITTEE FOR THE UNITED STATES 
OF EUROPE 
1. OPENING OF THE AFTERNOON SESSION BY 
MR JACQUES DELORS 
President of the Commission 
of the European Communities 
The fact that this morning's debate went on longer than planned 
demonstrates the value of Fran~ois Duchene's report. You have 
just seen a film which illustrates Jean Monnet's philosophy 
exceptionally well. In it you also saw Robert Schuman, Konrad 
Adenauer, Alcide de Gas peri and a number of others who, we 
must not forget, took the political responsibility for implementing 
his ideas. 
We can now move on to our second session and give the floor to 
our young Secretary-General, David Williamson, who is to chair 
this afternoon's round-table discussion on the past, present and 
future of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe. 
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2. MR DAVID F. WILLIAMSON 
Secretary-General of the Commission 
of the European Communities 
I agree with you, Mr President, that we need to discuss all three 
aspects. We must give some thought to the present and the future. 
I am very much in favour of that approach, possibly because I 
still cherish the illusion of being young. But I also believe that the 
past can teach us something about the future role of the 
revitalized Action Committee. 
Pascal Fontaine has produced a report as a basis for the 
round-table discussion. 
3. REPORT BY MR PASCAL FONTAINE 
Professor at the Paris Institute of Political Studies 
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1. When the French National Assembly rejected the draft 
European Defence Community treaty on August 1954 Jean 
Monnet was obviously a disappointed man. But he was not taken 
unawares, nor was he discouraged. His pragmatism and his active 
approach prompted him to draw his own conclusions from his 
setback. In his memoirs he wrote: 'I pondered on how to ensure 
that political forces everywhere ceased to act as a brake and 
become instead the motor of European unity'. The lesson Monnet 
learned from this failure was that all political parties, whether in 
power or in opposition, would have to be involved in the 
European venture. His aim was to secure a consensus to ensure 
that the new European treaties he had set his heart on could 
count on support that did not rely solely on the ups and downs of 
national political fortunes. 
2. This analysis was consonant with Monnet's method, his belief 
that history has its key moments and its key forces. The key 
moments were those where he sensed that a new start was 
possible and in 1945-55 the key forces were the political parties 
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and the trade unions. The method was concertation, the formula 
which had ensured the success of both the Modernization Plan 
and the Schuman Plan. 
Monnet therefore decided to relinquish the presidency of the 
ECSC High Authority so that he could be free to work once more 
for European unity. He announced that he would not be seeking 
renewal of his appointment, which was to expire in February 
1955, and he shared as an ordinary European citizen in the 
upsurge of intellectual and political activity which enlivened 1954 
and 1955. He obviously worked closely with Paul-Henri Spaak 
and Jan Beyen, the authors of the Benelux Memorandum, which 
led to the relaunching of Europe at Messina. 
3. What Monnet really wanted at the same time was to recreate 
a European dynamic from the success of the Schuman Plan, the 
tide of support for the European idea and the failure of the 
European Army project to which he had of course contributed, 
since it was he who initiated the European Defence Community 
treaty with Rene Pleven. There could be no surrender, the 
European dynamic had to be renewed. 
The Action Committee for the United States of Europe was 
formed on 13 October 1955 and was active until 1975. For 20 
years an unofficial organization, virtually unknown to the general 
public, had a decisive influence on the integration process. For 
Monnet the Committee served not only as a framework for action 
but also as the means of advancing the European cause to which 
he had dedicated himself. The Committee epitomized his 
method-which we discussed this morning-and his concentra-
tion, that is to say, his ability and determination to do one thing 
at a time, in this case to build the United States of Europe. 
4. I propose to examine the Committee in two stages. First I 
will consider the Committee as a force for European integration 
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throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Then I will make a brief 
evaluation of the Committee's record, identifying its successes, its 
intuitions, its limitations and the lessons we might learn for action 
today. 
5. The Committee as a force for European integration 
Let me begin by saying what the Committee was not. It was not a 
European movement or a 'think-tank'. Nor was it a lobby in the 
normal sense of the term. It was a unique creation tailored to 
Monnet's method; it was a pressure group of sorts, embodying 
power because the basic principle governing its composition was 
that members were not individuals but representatives of their 
parties and trade unions. 
When the Committee was formed on 13 October 1955, three 
principles were defined. First, members would not be acting in a 
personal capacity. They had to be formally appointed by their 
organizations, which presupposed some internal discussion. The 
second principle was that the Committee was pledged to realizing 
the objectives set at Messina. The Messina communique had 
listed a number of objectives, and Monnet was determined that 
each and every objective should be attained. The third principle 
was vital: members of the Committee had to endorse and 
champion the basic principle of delegation of sovereignty. This, 
no doubt, is why they had agreed to sit on the Action Committee 
for the United States of Europe in the first place. 
A few months after the failure of the European Defence Com-
munity and the embryonic political cooperation treaty, the inclu-
sion of the 'United States of Europe' in the title of the Committee 
was a highly significant and audacious step for both Monnet and 
its members. In forming the Committee, Monnet was perpetuat-
ing his method of working through politicians, influencing them, 
inspiring them and projecting through them rna terial objectives 
for European unity. 
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6. Membership of the Committee included all the political 
parties of the Community of Six; Social Democrats, Christian 
Democrats and Liberals, representing two-thirds of the European 
electorate, were members from the outset, as were all the free and 
Christian trade unions, representing 10 million workers. Between 
1955 and 1975, 130 individuals sat as members. A key factor from 
the start was the support of the German Social Democrats. They 
had been hostile to the first European Coal and Steel Community 
but were converted to the cause by the intercession of DGB trade 
unionist Walter Freitag. His experience on the ECSC Consulta-
tive Committee convinced him of Monnet's intentions and he won 
Erich Ollenhauer and Herbert Wehner over to the European idea. 
Winning the SPD's support was undoubtedly the Committee's 
first major achievement. 
Let me mention some of these 130 individuals-and I must 
apologize for not mentioning them all-who were the backbone 
of the Committee over the years: 
For France I would mention Pflimlin, Pinay, Lecourt, Pleven, 
Mollet, Maurice Faure, Giscard d'Estaing, Defferre. For Ger-
many, Brandt, Kiesinger, Barzel, Schmidt, Wehner, Scheel. For 
Italy: La Malfa, Fanfani, Moro, Forlani, Piccoli, Rumor, Mala-
godi, Nenni, Saragat. For the United Kingdom, Douglas-Home, 
Heath, Jenkins. For the Benelux countries, Tindemans, Leburton, 
Lefevre, Werner, Biesheuvel, den Uyl. 
They represented the cream of Europe's political leadership at the 
time and as members of the Committee were to have frequent 
dealings with Monnet and become imbued with his philosophy. 
7. How did the Committee operate? There were no formal rules, 
there was no constitution, there was simply an approach. And in 
describing it, the simile of an iceberg is not altogether inappro-
priate, the tip of the iceberg corresponding to what was made 
public. 
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The Committee held 18 full meetings during its lifetime, roughly 
one a year. Each meeting was followed by the publication of a 
resolution or a joint declaration. This represented the common 
ground, or rather a consensus, between all the members and had, 
of course, been worked on in advance by Monnet and his team to 
secure their agreement. Two of these resolutions won spectacular 
acceptance: the resolutions of January 1956 and June 1967 were 
submitted for ratification or rather parliamentary endorsement by 
the parliaments of the six Member States. 
The Committee's resolutions were designed not only to set general 
objectives and focus European aspirations, but also to define 
specific and immediate targets bearing on intra-Community reali-
ties and debates. They also provided an element of reaction to 
immediate events on occasion. One example of this was de 
Gaulle's now famous Volapiik press conference on 15 May 1962, 
probably one of the most awkward moments of the 1960s, when 
he launched an attack on supranationality and the Community 
or, to be more precise, on the Community institutions. This was 
followed on 26 June by a declaration from the Committee 
restating the basic principles, the terms of reference and the 
interest of Community action. To take a more recent example: 
Mrs Thatcher's Bruges speech on 20 September last could well 
have prompted a reaction from the Committee restating and 
explaining the parameters and the ambitions of the Community 
method. 
8. The submerged part of the iceberg corresponded to behind-
the-scenes activity by Monnet himself. He considered that it was 
his duty to concern himself exclusively with the Committee and 
the European cause, unlike the politicians who had other tasks to 
perform and other responsibilities to bear. He was a full-time 
campaigner for Europe and therein lay his strength. Those who 
knew him know that his work consisted mainly of meeting after 
meeting, hundreds of telephone calls, constant travelling. He 
never hesitated to give of himself, to go to Brussels, Bonn or 
Washington to persuade people. 
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His offices were in the avenue Foch in Paris. His secretariat was 
minimal: Max Kohnstamm and Jacques Van Helmont, helped by 
Franc;ois Duchene and Richard Mayne for a number of years. 
More than this small team, what explains the Committee's 
capacity for impetus and influence during this time was the fact 
that other forces gathered around this nucleus in what might be 
described as concentric circles. 
All sorts of people, because of personal contacts, bacause they 
had known Monnet for a long time, because they had been won 
over to the cause, endeavoured to make their contribution. The 
first concentric circle was formed by the 'friends', longstanding 
colleagues from the Modernization Plan and the ECSC: Etienne 
Hirsch, Pierre Uri, Robert Marjolin, Paul Delouvrier, Bernard 
Clappier. Very close to them came the 'acquaintances' and 'allies', 
those who could be approached, mobilized, asked to produce an 
urgent memo: first, the Committee members themselves and then 
the friends, the journalists, the professional men and women, all 
part of a Monnet network. Many of them are with us here 
today. 
Beyond the network was a circle of 'well-wishers'. From the 
records and correspondence, I have been able to identify nearly 
500 people throughout Europe who were involved in one way or 
another with what might be termed a creative European force in 
the 1960s. They helped the Committee to grow from a small, 
highly-flexible nucleus to become what Jean-Jacques Servan-
Schreiber has called 'a federal authority of the mind'. 
In addition to the contributions from individual members, from 
this creative force the Committee used to commission technical 
reports on highly specific matters to provide specific answers to 
difficult problems. Louis Armand, Robert Triffin, Walter Hall-
stein and Edgard Pisani, were among those who contributed 
meaty reports on crucial issues such as atomic energy and 
Euratom, the currency problem and the terms on which the 
United Kingdom could joint the European Community. 
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9. The Committee's record 
I must pick and choose here for the Committee naturally dealt 
with a mountain of business in 20 years. Everything that had a 
practical bearing on Community developments was considered in 
one way or another. But there were priorities. So I will make a 
choice. 
10. Let me begin with the successes. The first, the Committee's 
initial objective, as the 13 October declaration provided, was 
implementation of the Messina resolution of 1 June 1955. Monnet 
and his team contributed to the Benelux Memorandum, so much 
so that Spaak sent it to him on 6 May 1966 with the message 
'Herewith your child'. 
From the outset the Committee was keenly aware of the choice to 
be made between an atomic energy Community and a general 
common market. It is true that Monnet, under the influence of 
Louis Armand, 1Nas more aware in the early days of the value of a 
sectoral atomic energy Community. However, he soon saw that 
the Germans in particular would be more interested in the 
relaunching exercise if a general common market were included. 
And what the Committee strived for from the beginning was a 
parallelism between the two: atomic energy and a general com-
mon market. 
In the early days the Committee was at pains to ensure that the 
Treaties on the drawing board incorporated what were truly 
Community institutions. Monnet's fear was that, after the Euro-
pean Defence Community debacle, governments might opt for 
some intergovernmental arrangement. For this reason the Com-
mittee was very much on its guard to ensure that the institutions 
were Community institutions and that the balance between the 
Commission, the Council, the Court of Justice and Parliament 
was preserved. 
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The Committee's second success was the part it played in resisting 
efforts by the United Kingdom to transform the embryonic 
Community into a huge free-trade area. In October 1956 Harold 
Macmillan had proposed large-scale negotiations that would 
bring all the countries of western Europe together in a free-trade 
area. The threat took on sharper contours when the Maudling 
Committee was set up within the OECD. The Committee issued a 
warning to those around the table at the Val Duchesse Confer-
ence against the dangers of the new Communities being engulfed 
rather than merely diluted by a free-trade area. 
The third success was, so to speak, the counterpart of the second. 
Monnet was very firm and vigilant with the British. He knew 
them better than anyone else and was determinted that they 
should not jeopardize the very basis of what was a supranation-
ally-minded Community. From as early as 1960, he was a staunch 
supporter of British membership of the Community, under the 
same rules and practices. I think that the Committee played a 
decisive role here, particularly since the British application, and 
those of the other three candidates, was controversial at the time. 
Monnet set an example in 1968 by inviting the three British 
political parties to join the Committee, after de Gaulle's second 
veto had momentarily slammed the door. He used all his skills to 
explain to the British that it was in their interest, when they 
joined the Community, to accept the Treaties and abide by the 
same rules as everyone else rather than embark on lengthy, 
complicated negotiations to undermine its foundations. 
The fourth success is difficult to explain, but of enormous 
importance. There had been a number of crises between 1962 and 
1969. Let me remind you of them: 
- in 1962: the Volapiik crisis, when de Gaulle fiercely attacked 
the Community spirit and the Brussels institu-
tions; 
- in 1965: the 'empty chair' crisis, when for six months France 
withdrew from the European institutions and the 
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principle of majority voting in the Council was 
called into question; 
1963 to 1967: the two vetos on British membership, a Franco-
European and even a Franco-Atlantic crisis. 
What was to be done? As Monnet saw it, the important thing was 
to preserve the links, to maintain the cohesion between the Six 
and the forces which sought to defend the Community spirit, to 
keep the dialogue going at all costs, to hold fast to principles, to 
support the Commission and the European Parliament, to uphold 
Community doctrine and to persuade those who were not yet 
convinced. And he managed to do it. Some of the solutions found 
could be attributed to the perseverence of the Committee and 
Monnet himself, to his presence and to cultivation of the Com-
munity spirit during a difficult period. 
11. This brings one to the intuitions, the bold ideas floated by 
the Committee which were not acted upon but which sowed the 
seeds of developments which have already borne fruit or are in 
the process of doing so. 
It is interesting that as early as November 1959, the Committee 
adopted a resolution calling for a monetary policy based on three 
principles: the liberalization of capital movements, the coordina-
tion of budget and credit policies, and the creation of a European 
reserve fund. As far back as 1959, we had come up with the 
blueprint for the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, which 
saw the light of day in 1973, and a European currency, which is 
still a burning issue in the 1980s. 
The second intuition has been mentioned on a number of 
occasions this morning. It was the idea of an equal partnership 
between Europe and the United States. There is a close parallel 
between the Committee's declaration of 26 June 1962 and John F. 
Kennedy's Philadelphia speech on 4 July of that year urging that 
an enlarged Community embracing the United Kingdom should 
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form a partnership of equals with the United States to create two 
pillars of the western world. It was a grand design common to 
Monnet and Kennedy, and it was on that basis that the Commit-
tee saw the possibility of a genuine, balanced dialogue, not only 
with the United States but with the Communist world too. 
The third intuition was political union. This was perhaps one of 
the major misunderstandings of those years. De Gaulle proposed 
a plan for 'confederation' at a press conference on 5 September 
1960. On 22 November Monnet sent a letter to the members of 
the Committee, which I feel I must quote. 
Taking de Gaulle's proposals one by one, he wrote: 
'If we followed that course we should soon be faced with two 
methods: the integration method established by the Treaties for 
the three existing Communities and the method to be adopted for 
political, defence and education issues will, on the face of it, be 
different. But is that any reason for not seeking a measure of 
unity? I think not. In the circumstances, we must once again 
adopt an empirical approach. I believe-and I put it to you-that 
it would be a very good thing to develop different organizations 
simultaneously within the same European system: a Council of 
the six Heads of Government: a Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Education; and the European Communities 
with their rules, institutions and responsibilities. I believe that a 
kind of "European confederation" could usefully play this role. 
As I see it, such a body offers, at this point in time, the best 
means of advancing towards a more complete form of European 
unity. I have no doubt that a confederation will one day lead to a 
federation. But, for the moment, is it possible to go further? I 
cannot say that it is. Meanwhile the confederation would have the 
very great advantage of assuring public opinion in our countries 
that they have joined an entity which is not only economic but 
political, and that they are therefore part of something bigger 
than any of their countries alone.' 
This 1960 letter is particularly interesting because much of what 
we have today, notably Article 3 of the Single European Act, is 
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there. But things did not turn out as they might have done at the 
time. Events decided otherwise. 
12. Although Monnet was prepared to talk with de Gaulle, our 
partners were perhaps suspicious, somewhat wary, of French 
intentions. The first Fouchet Plan had been well received but the 
second, reworked by France in January 1962, had not gone down 
so well, because it questioned the very independence of the 
Community institutions and made them subordinate to intergov-
ernmental cooperation. Then came the 15 May 1962 press 
conference when de Gaulle took issue with the Europe of 'myths, 
fictions and pageants', making dialogue even more difficult. So de 
Gaulle and Monnet failed to come together at that time. With 
hindsight perhaps we can now see that they wanted to achieve the 
same goal by different routes. 
13. This brings me to the Committee's limitations. One may 
well ask why after the meeting in May 1973 Monnet himself, in 
consultation with all the members, decided to wind up the 
Committee and to announce on 9 May 1975, the 25th anniversary 
of the Schuman Declaration, that it was no more. 
Perhaps the European political context had changed, which 
meant that his 1955 assessment of the key forces had changed and 
that methods and objectives had to change too. 
14. There were in fact two developments. The first was the 
emergence of the European Council in 1974, and remember that 
the European Council was largely the fruit of Monnet's efforts. 
How did he see things? The Paris Summit in October 1972 had 
drawn up an ambitious programme for the Community which 
was to be transformed into a European Union by the end of the 
decade. Monnet wanted the heads of government, who had 
embarked on this programme, to accept personal responsibility. 
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He also noted the emergence of new sociological and political 
phenomena in the 1970s, namely the personalization and concen-
tration of executive power. The men who were responsible, the 
men with the power, were the heads of government. 
He probably realized that the time had come for his source of 
influence, the political parties as such, to give way in the interests 
of the cause to the heads of government. So in 1973 he drafted a 
memorandum entitled 'Constitution and Action of a Provisional 
European Government'. This memorandum is the blueprint for 
what the European Council has since become. Monnet took it to 
the magic triangle of the day, the Franco-German-British triangle 
of Georges Pompidou, Willy Brandt and Edward Heath, and won 
them over. And when the three corners of the triangle were 
replaced in national elections he called on Valery Giscard d 'Esta-
ing, Harold Wilson and Helmut Schmidt in early 1974 and won 
them over. So it was that at the Paris Summit of 1974, Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing could proclaim: "The Summit is dead: long live 
the European Council.' 
15. A second factor was election of the European Parliament by 
universal suffrage. This institutional innovation, decided upon in 
1974, had been suggested by the Committee as far back as 1960. 
The fact that the political parties were regrouping, were becoming 
players on the international and European stage, also modified 
Monnet's assessment of the Committee's role. A new structure 
which would exert a Europeanist pressure and lobby for a 
Europeanist policy was in the making. Monnet must therefore 
have considered that a page had turned and that the Committee 
no longer matched the new power patterns of the late 1970s. 
16. Let me conclude with a few remarks that I would take the 
liberty of addressing to those who are keen to continue Monnet's 
work with a committee. 
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The first point is that you must always involve the political 
parties because they embody democracy and follow the logic of 
the electoral see-saw. You must influence not only the parties in 
power but also those in opposition; they may form a government 
one day and you must inspire them with the European idea even 
though they are not yet in charge of the nation's affairs. 
The second point is that you must always involve the trade 
unions, but it seems to me no less essential to involve the world of 
industry and commerce too, for it will be largely responsible for 
the success of 1992. 
The third point is that you can now no longer do without the 
media and public opinion. Monnet chose to act through politi-
cians; he never sought publicity, did not care for speaking in 
public, only rarely appeared on television. Would that be possible 
today I wonder? It is difficult to say but I do know that the power 
game has been changed by the eruption of the media into political 
life. 
Fourthly, if I were asked to list themes benefiting the Committee's 
spirit and lineage, I would suggest four: 
- One, the Committee would obviously be concerned with 1992. 
It would keep a watchful eye, maintain constant pressure to 
ensure that deadlines are met, that there are no "special cases', 
no exceptions, that no one challenges the undertakings given 
in the Single European Act. 
- Two, monetary union. This had been one of the Committee's 
themes from as early as 19 59 and is becoming increasingly 
important. 
- Three, European defence: the Committee born of the failure 
of the European Defence Community can rise again with the 
re-emergence of the idea of a European defence policy. For 
European defence also means redefining Europe's relations 
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with the West, finally implementing the grand design for 
partnership with the United States. There is a lot of talk, but 
we don't yet know how to erect a European pillar. We need to 
find a structure and at the same time create the conditions of a 
new dialogue with the East. What is happening in Moscow 
and elsewhere presents a challenge to us, and to meet it we 
must have a clear idea of how we see Community Europe and 
its defence. For Mikhail Gorbachev's "common European 
house' is not ours. Let us build our own house first, then we 
will see whether we can live together with Mikhail 
Gorbachev. 
- Four, the conditions for further enlargement. Monnet was 
always very concerned about enlargements. He devoted a 
substantial part of his time to the terms of British, Danish and 
Irish membership. How would he view potential or actual 
applications from the EFTA countries, from Turkey, from 
countries which are perhaps "the orphans of Europe', coun-
tries that have no wish to be the orphans of 1992 and are now 
involved in what we are doing. How can we ensure that 
further enlargement does not lead to a dilution of Europe. 
How do we preserve what we have achieved? 
Last but not least, if the Committee wants to be faithful to what 
Monnet achieved, if it wants to illustrate or simply understand his 
secret, it must be loyal to his principles. He himself never stopped 
saying: 'There's no mystery in what I've done. There's a lot of toil 
and a lot of trouble'. 
I like that very much. It implies an enormous personal commit-
ment, instant accessibility and the ability to create trust, to 
generate trust, to make it common property. 
4. MR DAVID F. WILLIAMSON 
Secretary-General of the Commission 
of the European Communities 
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I would like to thank Pascal Fontaine for his contribution. I 
found it extremely useful, as it provides us with topics for our 
discussion. Let me stress the importance of giving some thought 
to the present and the future, as Pascal Fontaine did at the end of 
his report. I believe that the Action Committee for a United 
States of Europe was both a pressure group and a network of 
influence, led by a man capable of mobilizing the political parties. 
The commitment of Europe's leaders was absolutely vital. 
A first topic which springs to mind is how Monnet succeeded in 
winning over the political parties, the trade unions and industry. 
Are we capable of doing the same today? 
A second topic might be the fact that Monnet's Action Commit-
tee was born of failure, of a search for a basis for revival. Do the 
options in the Single Act provide us with the right basis for 
revival? Were there any alternatives? 
A third topic could be the practical attainment of Europe's 
objectives. Monnet's Action Committee, as Pascal Fontaine quite 
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rightly said, was not a think-tank. Have we now found the most 
effective means of achieving our goals? I will therefore declare the 
discussion open and invite the various speakers to comment on 
these points. 
81 
5. MR MAX KOHNSTAMM 
Secretary-General of the Action Committee for Europe 
It is a great honour and a great pleasure for me to take part in 
this round table. Having had the good fortune to share for almost 
40 years in the exalting adventure of European integration, I have 
now asked-as you may know-to be released from my post as 
Secretary-General of the Action Committee for Europe after the 
meeting in The Hague on 17 and 18 November. 
The role of the Action Committee is to propose and support 
action which it considers essential for progress towards European 
Union and which has the support of its members, drawn as they 
are from all parts of the political spectrum, from the ranks of 
workers and employers. It is the task of the Secretary-General to 
help the Committee carry out that mission. 
Today I wish to talk to you briefly about what I believe to be the 
main problem the Community will have to tackle after 1992. 
But let me begin with a preliminary remark. In all logic, what the 
Community has undertaken to do between now and 1992 is 
82 ACTION COMMITTEE FOR EUROPE 
impossible. The creation of a single market raises issues that go to 
the very heart of politics. There is no Community country in 
which decisions on social matters, industry, technology, transport 
and the environment are not preceded by debate and often fierce 
political battles. At the end of which, the decisions are taken by a 
government with the backing of a parliamentary majority of its 
own political hue. This is not to say that the political parties are 
never in agreement, but this tends to be exceptional and even then 
rarely extends to points of detail. 
But even with the Single Act, the Community's decision-making 
process still imposes unanimity or, in other words, consensus in 
many areas. 
In these circumstances, it is logically impossible for our govern-
ments and the institutions in their present form to attain the 1992 
objective that they themselves have set the Community. Happily, 
I have not forgotten what I heard Jean Monnet tell somebody 
who was speaking of the French love of logic: 'Logic', he said, 
'makes no sense'. 
I am convinced that, logic or no logic, the Community will 
succeed in taking the decisions which are essential for the creation 
of the single market. It will succeed because the process which the 
Community has started, or, if you like, the machinery it has set in 
motion, is so powerful that any difficulties will be overcome. 
The Action Committee is obliged by its nature and its composi-
tion to seek consensus. Which is why I am not quite sure that the 
Action Committee can help to produce solutions to certain 
thorny problems (taxation, for instance). True, it has to press for 
decisions to be taken on taxation, and in other areas, such as the 
environment and the social dimension. But it will probably have 
to confine itself to defining basic principles to guide Community 
action. 
The Action Committee will also take account of the fact that, 
fortunately, the Single Act has added substantially to the status of 
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the European Parliament, an institution which is not obliged to 
produce a consensus, and whose decisions are frequently taken by 
a majority. 
In my opinion the Action Committee can in future be of most 
service in those areas where it will still be for the national 
parliaments to take decisions on the next stages of the integration 
process. 
One example here is the monetary field, for which the Single Act 
stipulates that 'in so far as further development in the field of 
economic and monetary policy necessitates institutional changes, 
the provisions of Article 236 shall be applicable'. The same is 
clearly true of external policy and the entirely new policy on 
security and defence. 
Allow me today to consider only what I personally believe will be 
the biggest problem facing the Community after 1992: the institu-
tional problem. The solution found will determine the Commun-
ity's future character! The institutional problem has, as I see it, 
three interrelated aspects: one, the need to strengthen the institu-
tions so that they will be able to administer the economic and 
monetary union effectively and democratically; two, the question 
of the Community's possible enlargement, with the many coun-
tries that will be asking to join us; and three-in the longer 
term-ways and means of overcoming the division of Europe. I 
am well aware that the European Parliament will have something 
to say on these issues; but the final decisions will still require the 
approval of national parliaments. 
It is obvious to me that in their present form and with their 
present methods the institutions will not be able to administer the 
economic and monetary union, especially if the enlarged Com-
munity has 15, 18 or, who knows, even more member coun-
tries. 
And it would, I feel, be betraying the Community's European 
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mission simply to say no to the democratic countries of Europe 
asking to join. 
But it would be no less a betrayal of that mission to agree to let 
the Community slide gradually into a mere free trade area and 
thus abandon the objective set at the very outset: to make the 
Community a true European union encompassing not only the 
economy but foreign, defence and security policy as well. 
The Action Committee has frequently stated that there can be no 
economic and social solidarity in the long term unless this 
solidarity also extends to matters of security through a common 
defence policy. Was the Action Committee mistaken? I think not. 
But there is a contradiction between that statement and opening 
up the European Community to all the democratic countries of 
Europe which ask to join, even if they will not or cannot accept 
the pooling in one form or another of external policy and the 
efforts of our countries in the area of defence and security. 
And what if, perhaps 10 years from now, European countries that 
are, shall we say, on the way to democracy, want to come closer 
to the Community in some way that will have to be agreed on? 
Mikhail Gorbachev has come up with the idea of the common 
European house as the solution to the division of Europe, that 
grievous legacy of the last war. 
I don't see how we can say no to this idea. Yalta and its 
aftermath were perhaps inevitable, but our countries and our 
Community can never accept that the ensuing division will be 
there for all time. 
The Community is the first step towards organizing Europe in a 
way which, for the first time in the history of our continent, does 
not rest on hegemony or domination. That is what has given us 
the right to call it the European Community. But because of this 
name we must, at the same time, produce our architect's design 
for the common European house. 
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It is inevitable, I fear, that after 1992 the Community will again 
be confronted with the institutional problem when ways have to 
be sought to manage, democratically and effectively, the eco-
nomic and monetary union which will be the certain consequence 
of the frontier-free market. We must therefore strengthen our 
institutions, building on the solid foundations we already have. 
However, this stronger institutional set-up must at the same time 
be flexible enough to accommodate if not actual enlargements of 
the Community, then at least cooperation arrangements which 
make it possible to resolve the contradiction I have just men-
tioned, and thus put the Community in a position to advance 
towards a true European Union. 
But there is something harder and trickier still! Europe cannot 
provide a common house for all our democratic countries unless 
its doors are wide open to the West as well as to the East. Its 
design will be such that the Community will have to adapt its 
response to circumstances, as and when they change. 
That reminds me of a question that Jean Monnet put to me one 
day 35 years ago when he was President of the High Authority. 
He had asked me to report on what had happened in the 
European Coal and Steel Community during his absence in the 
summer. As we strolled through the Luxembourg countryside I 
was telling him about workers' housing, scrap, and so on. After a 
little while, he stopped and interrupted me, saying: 'Yes, that's 
very important, but what's our attitude towards Washington, and 
what's our attitude towards Moscow?' 
Needless to say no one today has a cut-and-dried answer to that 
one! 
And that is why I am convinced that in the coming years we shall 
have to consider and discuss in depth the three aspects that 
together make up the institutional problem. They are: the need to 
strengthen our institutions so that the Community can manage 
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the economic and monetary union and can advance towards 
European Union; a solution-membership or some other for-
mula-for those countries which wish in one way or another to be 
closer to the Community; and finally, our own design for the 
common European house. It will not be easy to find a consensus 
in the Community on an institutional arrangement that will cover 
all three. I hope that the Action Committee will be able to 
contribute to the discussion and help to ensure that it is without 
ill will and without favour. 
The Community is an economic and political necessity and its 
progress towards European Union will not now be halted. True, 
its path will be strewn with obstacles which from time to time will 
appear to paralyse it. We will often be unable to see the wood for 
the trees. That is why it is worth bearing in mind what has been 
the quintessence of the Community since its inception. It was and 
still is the bearer of hope! 
Let me finish with a quotation from a French scientist, Franc;ois 
Jacob. It is altogether in the spirit of Jean Monnet. It sums up my 
experience of sharing in the adventure that we know as the 
European Community. I quote: 'it is true that science endeavours 
to describe nature and to distinguish dream from reality. But we 
must not forget that man probably needs dream as much as 
reality. It is hope that gives sense to life, and hope is based on the 
prospect of one day being able to change this world into 
something that is possible and better'. 
6. MR DAVID F. WILLIAMSON 
Secretary-General of the Commission 
of the European Communities 
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Our thanks to Max Kohnstamm for defining the Action Commit-
tee's present and future tasks, notably as regards institutional 
reform and the idea of a common European house. He has, I 
think, provided us with some extremely interesting topics for 
further discussion. 
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7. MR JACQUES CHABAN-DELMAS 
Former Prime Minister of France and member of 
the Action Committee for Europe 
1. This symposium is an exciting occasion for me. The word is 
not too strong, because we are here to build the future and it is 
the future that counts. But an understanding of the past is 
essential if we are to take the right road, if we are not to repeat 
the old mistakes. 
Pascal Fontaine's introductory address took us all back in time. I 
myself have been deeply involved in action for Europe since 1949. 
In 1954, for example, as a convinced but far from mystical 
European, I found myself on the side of those who torpedoed the 
European Defence Community. I would like to say that there was 
a compelling reason on the French side at the time. It has never 
been mentioned but I can reveal it today and you will all 
understand. We had established that the Americans were going to 
allow the Russians to have not only the atomic bomb but also the 
vectors to carry it over American territory. That meant that, 
sooner or later, the American atomic umbrella would have a hole 
in it. 
When this came to light in 1952 we decided, with a handful of 
politicians, scientists and military men, to give France a nuclear 
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deterrent. And we did it in complete secrecy. We diverted 
hundreds of millions of old francs (luckily Jacques Delors is here, 
as he was at the Matignon, to see that the sums are right) without 
anybody noticing. The money came from the budget of the 
Ministry of Defence and appropriations for the Atomic Energy 
Commissariat. Paul Delouvrier over there knows all about it. In 
mounting this very difficult, very costly operation, with the 
Americans not only giving us no assistance but actually trying to 
put us off, it was clear that if the European Defence Community 
were to come into being the whole project was finished. 
A few of us believed that for France and for Europe a nuclear 
capability was crucial to the future. No one challenges this today 
and there is no doubt that the British and French nuclear forces 
(and remember that the French forces are free from any outside 
interference) are essential, as are conventional weapons, in pro-
viding a European defence system. All of this emerges clearly 
from the records of the Action Committee for Europe. That is 
why convinced Europeans were forced in the end to oppose a 
Treaty on which Europe's hopes were pinned in those days. 
2. Later I was to discover that Charles de Gaulle too was 
European through and through, but clearly, as was said just now, 
with methods that differed from those of Jean Monnet. You will 
remember how his return to power in 1958 caused panic in 
European circles, you will remember everyone saying that Europe 
had had it, that the Treaty of Rome would fall apart. I knew 
better, but I still had to make sure. 
Two days after his investiture, before he left for Algeria, de 
Gaulle called me in to discuss my personal position. I seized the 
opportunity to tell him what people were saying. And he replied: 
'There is no question of France blocking application of the Treaty 
of Rome. What is more, we are going to regularize our situation'. 
France had asked for derogations on 1 January 1959 because she 
was experiencing difficulties. 'We are not going to seek any 
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derogations', said de Gaulle, 'we are going to accept the common 
market in full'. He authorized me to announce this publicly a few 
days later in Liege at a Congress of the Council of European 
Municipalities, an organization I helped to found in 1951. I 
scored the greatest rostrum success of my career, when I told 
2 000 convinced Europeans that the common market had nothing 
to fear, France was going to play by the rules. 
3. We did have the Volapiik affair in 1962, but that was really a 
French domestic crisis. Then in 1962 and 1967 we had the vetoes 
on British membership. This was because de Gaulle had estab-
lished that our British friends wanted to come in, but were not 
prepared to accept Community rules. This represented a serious 
threat, especially for the common market. On this de Gaulle 
agreed completely with Monnet: the United Kingdom would have 
to comply with Community rules. 
In 1969 came de Gaulle's attempt to treat with the British. Some 
of you will recall the incident with Christopher Soames, who in 
fact was unfairly attacked. In two gruelling conversations with de 
Gaulle I had to take up the cudgels in defence of Soames who had 
given the impression of talking out of turn and wrecking de 
Gaulle's bid to reopen the dialogue with the United Kingdom. 
Essentially de Gaulle was all for Europe, though he had a 
different approach. 
4. In the second half of 1958, Monnet came to see me. We knew 
each other well, and he knew that I too had a pragmatic mind. I 
am a man of action, but I do take time for reflection before 
deciding. Having Jacques Delors around facilitates reflection. But 
with Monnet we were in a situation that called for some serious 
thinking. 
In one hour with Monnet one could review the world situation 
several times over. He said to me: 'De Gaulle is back, the British 
REPORT BY JACQUES CHABAN-DELMAS 91 
will join before long. There's no point in being stubborn. We can 
find ways and means later but this is not the moment. We can't 
leave it like that, glaring defiantly at each other. Do something 
and get us talking again'. 
So I did something, not on my own of course. Paul Delouvrier 
took a hand too. The end result was de Gaulle's press conference, 
Monnet's letter on European confederation, and reconciliation 
between Monnet and de Gaulle. Since then, the British have come 
in, as have others. And we still have our dual system-the 
Community and its structures on the one hand and the advance 
towards economic and monetary union on the other-and at the 
risk of embarassing him I must say that in this area Jacques 
Delors' role at the head of the Commission has been decisive. 
With the Single Act and all that flows from it, we are well and 
truly on the road to economic and monetary union. But we are 
still at the cooperation stage when it comes to security, defence 
and foreign affairs. Max Kohnstamm was quite right when he 
said that one of the problems in the years ahead will be to 
enhance the European institutions and then to change them, 
perhaps first in degree, then later in kind. 
5. Today, tomorrow and what about the day after? First let me 
say that, while Max Kohnstamm has revealed a gift for oratory, 
we owe the new Committee to Karl Carstens, to whom I would 
like to express my gratitude. There are some things you cannot 
say man to man; you can only say them in public. I congratulate 
him for having had the brilliant idea of relaunching the Action 
Committee for Europe. Between 1980 and 1984 Europe was 
wilting, so to speak. It was absolutely essential to revive it and the 
crucial moment was at hand. 
I also thank him for his human touch. To my mind, the human 
touch counts for more than all the dossiers, the statistics, the 
things that can be quantified and measured, for it is people that 
matter. The prime purpose of any political action must be to 
defend the individual and promote his personal development. 
92 ACTION COMMITTEE FOR EUROPE 
That is what life is about: it means serving others, beginning with 
those in greatest need; it means respecting the dignity of the 
individual; it means having the human touch. And I have to say 
that Karl Carstens is outstanding in that respect. So let me thank 
him, let us all thank him. Whatever happens there is no question 
of our doing without his wisdom, his advice, his suggestions, and 
I have every reason to believe we will go along with them. As for 
Max Kohnstamm, all I can say is that if he resigns as Secretary-
General that is his decision, but he will not be replaced. We will 
arrange matters in such a way that he too will remain in the 
centre of things. Look, he is not even protesting! 
As for the future-apart from the task of increasing our member-
ship-the Committee, as Max Kohnstamm so rightly said, does 
have a role to play. He even outlined it for us. We have to 
predicate our action on guidelines. I have just spoken of institu-
tional problems, economic union, security and defence. But there 
is another vital area to which I made an oblique reference when I 
spoke about people: the social area. How can we expect to 
succeed in making Europe a stable and durable entity, unless our 
prime, our constant concern is the fate of the millions of men and 
women who are in difficulty. 
I would like to float an idea, an idea for preventive action. We are 
four years from completion of the single market. In that time 
more and more fears and anxieties will arise. Because there will be 
many casualties. When you embark on a project like the single 
market-based in the last analysis on competition, competitive-
ness, successive challenges-there are bound to be winners and 
losers. That's how it is in soccer, rugby and tennis. Employees, 
trade unions, the professions and many others will become 
anxious, and we will see the emergence of resistance. Why don't 
we, each of us in our own country, act to dispel those fears, allay 
that anxiety. Why don't we take preventive action, urge our 
governments, here and now, to think about the potential casual-
ties, to do something to cushion the effect when the time comes, 
and to publicize the fact, now and in the years ahead, that 
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preventive action is planned. This is grist to the Committee's 
mill-an area in which action is needed. 
Then there is the cultural factor. Last night, during the ceremony 
at the Pantheon, Franc;ois Mitterand recalled that at the end of 
his life Monnet had said 'If I had to do it all over again, I would 
begin with cultural Europe'. 
It is true that culture is life. We cannot ignore cultural Europe, 
with the prodigious eruption of the media, which can influence 
not only governments, political parties, politicians, trade unions, 
industrialists, but public opinion too. And we must always be 
guided by public opinion if we claim to be democrats, as of 
course we all do. 
Then there is the environment, which Jacques Delors mentioned 
twice. I myself attach the greatest importance to the environment, 
since in my time I set up-and it is still there-a Ministry for the 
Environment and Quality of Life. There are any number of areas 
in which the Committee can initiate or extend its action. I am 
very happy indeed to be able to contribute a brick or two. For 
what we are building is Europe, the Europe of our dreams and 
desires. 
94 
8. MR DAVID F. WILLIAMSON 
Secretary-General of the Commission of the European 
Communities 
Thank you very much. You went beyond institutional reform and 
the idea of a common European house by stressing the human 
dimension, an extremely important point I feel. 
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9. MR KARL CARSTENS 
Former President of the Federal Republic of Germany 
1. First I would like to thank my friend, Jacques Chaban-
Delmas most sincerely for his very kind remarks. I am immensely 
grateful, though I feel they are not deserved. In contrast, I would 
agree completely with what he said about Max Kohnstamm, who 
was indeed the moving spirit behind our efforts from the very 
beginning and has been again in the last few years since we 
revived the Committee. 
2. Jacques Chaban-Delmas' comments have prompted me too 
to talk a little about the past and say a few words about Konrad 
Adenauer. Twice during his lifetime, Adenauer was able to make 
a decisive contribution towards the founding and strengthening of 
the European Communities. The first was in May 1950, as we saw 
in the film, with Robert Schuman's declaration on the founding 
of the European Coal and Steel Community as a step towards 
European integration, and at the same time as a contribution to 
Franco-German understanding, cooperation and friendship. 
Adenauer was involved in this process from the very outset. The 
second highpoint, in my view, was the conclusion of the Elysee 
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Treaty with France in 1963, which put Franco-German relations 
on a new footing, with the declared aim, moreover, of promoting 
and consolidating the process of European Union. 
3. But of course we are here to talk about the future, so I will 
try to do just that in a rapid survey of the most important issues. 
As far as the single market is concerned, we all feel now that it 
can be achieved by the end of 1992. I say 'can', because there are 
still many obstacles to be overcome, but it is my belief that a 
considerable breakthrough has been made in recent months. I can 
only add that all of us who are associated with the European 
venture should lend every possible support to the Commission, 
and in particular its President, Jacques Delors, to ensure that the 
single market does come into being in 1992. 
4. The issue of European monetary union is related to this. 
Unless I am mistaken, this has been under discussion for at least 
the last 35 years, and the question is always: which comes first, 
the chicken or the egg? Should monetary union be established 
first, and then common economic, financial and fiscal policies 
forged on that basis, or should we coordinate these policies first 
and then introduce monetary union as the icing on the cake? The 
debate is pointless. We must be pragmatic, and I believe that this 
is perfectly possible. As a German, I would ask the permission of 
the non-Germans present to say a few words about Germany's 
experience with inflation. That is really the most frightful experi-
ence which any country has ever known. Although it is 65 years 
ago, it is still indelibly imprinted in our memories. For several 
months, the value of the mark dropped by 100°/o every day, with 
the result that the final ratio of the new mark to the old was 
several billion to one. Most people in Germany had never even 
heard the word 'billion' before, and were confronted with it for 
the first time in the context of the currency reform. I am telling 
you this to try and explain why we in Germany are such fervent 
advocates of monetary stability. This is of course also related to 
the question of an independent European central bank. 
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5. The coordination of security and defence policies has been 
mentioned by a number of speakers. I believe that we in Europe 
should coordinate our own ideas on security and defence to a 
greater extent than hitherto. It may well be that the WEU is the 
most suitable forum in which to do this, although I am bound to 
say that this is, I think, the fourth attempt during my lifetime to 
develop the WEU into a new and powerful institution. The 
previous attempts were not particularly successful. However, this 
is a side issue, the main issue being how we see this coordination 
of European security and defence policy in relation to the United 
States. This, I think, is the question on which future develop-
ments will ultimately hinge, but I have yet to hear clear state-
ments on the matter. The concept of the two pillars evoked by 
Kennedy and Monnet is undoubtedly a good one, but more needs 
perhaps to be said about what it means in practice. 
6. That brings me to the coordination of foreign policy. This is 
an area where, in my view, extraordinary progress has been made. 
Regular consultations are now held between the 12 Foreign 
Ministers. The ambassadors of the Twelve in non-member coun-
tries meet once a month. The Community has succeeded in 
adopting a common position on important issues in the United 
Nations, at the CSCE and on disarmament issues. I think we have 
reason to be satisfied with the progress made. The outstanding 
achievement, in my opinion, is the fact that, after 30 years of 
opposition to the Community, the Soviet Union and the member 
countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance recog-
nized the Community a few months ago and declared their 
willingness to conclude an agreement with it. When we started 
out, 30 years ago, this was beyond our wildest dreams. 
7. We must take the most of the opportunities which events in 
the Soviet Union might-and will, we hope-bring for all Euro-
peans. However, a note of caution should perhaps be sounded. 
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Perestroika has not yet achieved its goal, and we can all see the 
problems still facing Mikhail Gorbachev. They are caused not 
least by the shortages which continue to beset the Soviet people. 
But I would reiterate that we should take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by events in the Soviet Union, and in 
other countries such as Hungary and Poland. 
8. In this context I would like to say a word about Germany. 
On 28 February 1957, during the negotiations leading to the 
founding of the common market, the German negotiator at the 
time, Ambassador Ophiils, made the following statement: 'The 
Federal Government assumes that it will be possible, in the event 
of the reunification of Germany, to review the EEC and Euratom 
Treaties'. The Five accepted this declaration without raising any 
objections. It is still a part of the Treaties, and the problem of 
German reunification is still unsolved. Moreover, to be realistic, 
there is no solution in prospect of the kind we envisaged 30 years 
ago. But, as I am among friends, I would like to say one thing: it 
would be wrong to think that Germans will eventually reconcile 
themselves to the division of their country, to the wall in Berlin or 
to the frontier fences along the Elbe. This border is contrary to 
nature and contrary to history, and Germans will constantly seek 
ways and means to remove it. 
As I see it, and I make this clear at every opportunity in 
Germany, any steps towards removing the border between the 
two Germanies should be taken in close cooperation with our 
European partners. I do not believe that a choice must be made 
between overcoming the division of Germany and German mem-
bership of the Community. On the contrary, I regard the Federal 
Republic's continued membership of the Community as the only 
real chance of gradually resolving the problems caused by the 
division of Germany. I would like to stress in this context that 
Germany as a whole derives benefit from the EEC Treaty, which 
created a free trade area between the German Democratic Repub-
lic and the Federal Republic. 
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9. Before concluding, I would like to mention two more points. 
The question of enlargement is important, and it would be bad 
policy to slam the door in the face of European countries wishing 
to join the Community. I feel, however, that we must make it 
clear to them that, because we are currently engaged in the 
process of creating the single market, we cannot at the same time 
conduct negotiations on the accession of new Member States. 
10. And, finally, a word on the institutions. In 1984 the 
European Parliament adopted a resolution on a constitution for 
the European Union. This, I might say, represents a grand vision, 
but one which, in the form in which it was adopted by Parlia-
ment, is unlikely to be accepted by the 12 national Parliaments, 
each of which will propose amendments. Parliament's design is 
still valid as a target to aim at. The Single European Act was 
adopted in 1986, marking a major step forward on many fronts, 
including the institutional front, since majority voting has now 
been extended to a number of areas. But the progress made-and 
here I am in full agreement with Max Kohnstamm-is not yet 
sufficient. 
The point which I would like to raise as regards institutional 
matters is the involvement of the European Parliament in the 
Community's legislative process. By this I mean the regulations, 
directives, etc. which are currently adopted by the Council, and in 
which Parliament, in my view, is not sufficiently involved. In each 
of our 12 democracies it is the people's representatives, the 
Parliaments, which adopt laws. The present situation, in my view, 
undermines the democracy of the Community, and I can see no 
cogent reason why Parliament's approval should not, or cannot, 
be required for legislative instruments to take effect. 
11. Finally, I would like to endorse what was said by my friend 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas. European culture and the strengthening 
of cultural ties between our countries are, I believe, of decisive 
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importance for the future of the Community. We should ensure 
that every boy and girl learns two Community languages in 
addition to his or her own, to remove the barriers which continue 
to hamper closer understanding between our peoples. 
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10. MR DAVID F. WILLIAMSON 
Secretary-General of the Commission of the European 
Communities 
Thank you for drawing our attention to such central issues as 
progress towards European monetary union, security and defence 
policy, relations with the Eastern bloc, the accession of other 
European countries and the balance to be struck between enlarge-
ment and strengthening the existing Community, and Parlia-
ment's role in the decision-making process. These questions are, 
in my view, vital to our future. 
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11. MR FRANCO-MARIA MALFATTI 
Former President of the Commission of the European 
Communities 
We are here today to pay tribute to Jean Monnet. I would 
therefore like to say a few words about the Action Committee for 
the United States of Europe, which he founded and inspired. It 
seems to me that the problems facing European integration today, 
at Community and international level, are such that it is essential 
for us to mobilize the political parties in our national Parliaments 
and, through them, both sides of industry and the public at 
large. 
The Action Committee for the United States of Europe was set 
up for this very purpose. Now that it is getting back to work 
again we must take advantage of every opportunity to raise 
public awareness and make Europe's voice heard on the major 
issues confronting us. We can achieve our goal if, as both 
Fran<;ois Duchene and Pascal Fontaine recalled earlier, we follow 
Monnet's example and adopt a practical, imaginative approach. 
But we must never lose sight of two fundamental principles: the 
transfer of sovereignty and the federalist approach. 
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What are the main political tasks now facing us? The first is to 
support the Commission. We have an important role to play in 
what has been termed the 'Commission party'. Attainment of the 
Community's major objectives-implementation of the Single 
Act, the 1992 deadline, both of which offer ample scope for 
progress towards European integration-will depend to a large 
extent on the support and backing given to the Commission. It is 
the exponent of the European viewpoint, the impetus and unify-
ing force behind the whole European venture. This is why I tend 
to be somewhat cautious when it comes to issues-often perfectly 
legitimate-connected with institutional reform and the constant, 
laudable flow of new ideas. I feel that this particular aspect-the 
strengthening of the Commission-must always be taken into 
account. 
I do not propose to go into details or mention the changes which 
could be brought about by introducing elections for, say, the 
President of the European Council. I would simply stress that, 
important though these proposals are, they must never upset the 
difficult but fine institutional balance which Franc;ois Duchene 
referred to this 1norning as a highly original 'dual executive'. Nor 
can they be allowed to jeopardize the special role that the 
Commission, with its right of initiative, plays as the driving force 
behind the Community. This being said, the Committee's primary 
task will be to support implementation of the Single Act with a 
view to meeting the 1992 deadline. 
A secondary task will be to back the President of the Commission 
in his· capacity as Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on 
economic and monetary union. I say economic and monetary 
union advisedly. I do not want to go back as far as Jacques 
Chaban-Delmas, who, if I am not mistaken, referred to 1959, but 
I do want to remain consistent with the conclusions on the 1972 
Paris Summit which drew up a programme for the newly-enlarged 
Community, encompassing the United Kingdom, Denmark and 
Ireland. The target then was to achieve economic and monetary 
union within 10 years and to crown the European enterprise by 
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establishing European Union. I consider it very positive that a 
special section on 'Economic and Monetary Union' was included 
in the Single Act, although I hasten to add that I find its 
provisions rather meagre. I am no expert, but I believe that 
monetary union would provide a solution to the problems Pierre 
Uri raised this morning. It is in the context of monetary and 
economic union that the whole issue of economic and social 
cohesion must be examined. This is one of the major challenges 
facing the Community, an opportunity for us to demonstrate that 
European integration, far from being technocratic, is based on 
openness and solidarity. 
I only mention the institutional aspects to suggest that the 
reference to Article 236 in the economic and monetary union 
section of the Single Act may have been inserted out of excessive 
caution, forcing the President of the Council to provide all 
manner of clarifications. But it does give us an insight into what 
full economic and monetary union could imply in terms of 
strengthening the institutions. It could provide an opportunity, at 
institutional level, giving further impetus to the Community. 
A third task will be to tackle the problems which the international 
situation raises for those in positions of responsibility at national 
or Community level, for European integration, and for our 
Committee. We are living in times of great change. We are faced 
with many problems: overwhelming indebtedness of the third 
world, a cause of constant concern to which no viable solution 
has yet been found; the United States' trade and balance of 
payments deficit and the associated problems of re-establishing a 
balance through concerted international action; the current 
GATT negotiations, the Uruguay Round, which are already 
being marred by protectionist tendencies. Today more than ever 
these issues require Europe to shoulder its responsibilities and 
speak with a single voice. But it is the positive development of 
East-West relations that has highlighted the growing need for 
Europe, for a single European voice on problems which we used 
to see as a matter for others. 
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We could have a lengthy discussion on why the positive step was 
taken of including Article 30 in the Single Act, why the word 
"security' was used rather than 'defence', and why it is linked to 
the political and economic aspects of security. I find it reassuring 
that Parliament in its discussion on 'security' also dealt with 
defence issues, subsequently adopting the paper with which we 
are all familiar. But such questions pale into insignificance when 
we consider the vast range of arms reduction talks now under way 
or about to begin. Following the successful outcome of the 
intermediate nuclear forces negotiations, thanks to the unity and 
resolve of the Europeans in support of their American allies, 
negotiations are now under way for a 50% reduction in strategic 
nuclear weapons and for the global elimination of chemical 
weapons. And I hope, as we all do, that we are on the eve of 
'conventional stability' negotiations for the reduction of conven-
tional weapons to prevent surprise attack. 
These negotiations raise the question of a radical re-think of the 
strategy of the Atlantic Alliance. The whole issue of the reduction 
of conventional weapons and the monitoring and verification 
problem are of immediate concern to the countries of Europe. 
I do not wish to dwell on this topic, but I would express the hope 
that all the points I have raised so far-regarded as somewhat 
marginal hitherto-will be brought to the fore in the near future 
and given our full attention. In this way we could demonstrate 
Europe's political will and make a significant contribution to the 
European enterprise. 
I do not believe that European Union can be seen as an end in 
itself. The objective of the common defence goal must be pursued 
at the same time. This obviously is a highly complex matter. We 
must not forget, as the ill-fated European Defence Community 
Treaty expressly stated, that European defence can be dealt with 
only in the context of the Atlantic Alliance. It is no coincidence 
that the 'Platform' issued at the Western European Union 
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meeting in The Hague in 1987 stressed the importance of the 
presence in Europe of US conventional and nuclear forces. 
A certain amount of imagination is needed to tackle the Euro-
pean defence issue. Perhaps there is no single solution and yet the 
problem will be twofold: how to push the interpretation of Article 
30 of the Single Act as far as possible and how to advance the 
discussions begun with the relaunch of the Western European 
Union. 
It seems to me that all these considerations point to one 
thing-the need to speak with a single voice on foreign policy in 
general. Political cooperation has achieved a great deal but much 
of what remains to be done can be tackled by the versatile Action 
Committee for the United States of Europe. It is a Committee 
which involves us personally but also as individuals in positions 
of responsibility in our political parties or parliaments, or in our 
trade unions and professional associations. Through these we can 
get the European message across and support the action taken by 
the Community on the Commission's initiative. 
It is quite clear to me that it is for people like us, not for the man 
in the street, to tackle the problems and tasks that I have 
described-and I have spoken as a politician, in realistic rather 
than idealistic terms-and that in doing so we will prove our 
worth. And this brings me to a natural conclusion-next year's 
European elections and Parliament's powers. It is true that the 
Single Act increased Parliament's powers. But because ours is a 
democratic Community the question of further powers, commen-
surate with our deeply-held democratic convictions and the major 
issues which will affect Europe's future, must necessarily remain 
on our agenda. 
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12. DAVID F. WILLIAMSON 
Secretary-General of the Commission of the European 
Communities 
I would like to thank Franco-Maria Malfatti for having placed 
our discussion in an international context. This is an extremely 
important aspect. I think we have now pinpointed a number of 
important topics and programmes for the revitalized Action 
Committee. Max Kohnstamm has a busy time ahead. The major 
themes so far are the strengthening of the institutions, defining 
our view of the common European house, progress towards 
European monetary union, security and defence, relations with 
the Eastern bloc countries with all the attendant issues, the 
question of striking a balance between further enlargement and 
strengthening the existing Community, the democratic deficit and 
Parliament's role in tomorrow's Europe. This is, I feel, a major 
action programme, which will run in tandem with our efforts to 
make a success of all aspects of the Single Act. We have already 
agreed on that. These other elements must now be added. It will 
entail a lot of work for all of us. 
Before doing my duty as a good soldier and handing over to 
Jacques Delors, I would like to thank everyone who contributed 
to today's symposium, to the participants in the round tables this 
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morning and this afternoon, and above all to Fran<;ois Duchene 
and Pascal Fontaine for presenting the reports on which we based 
our discussions. A special word of thanks to the organizers. 
While we all agree with Karl Carstens' ideas on language skills, 
many of us have a long way to go. I would therefore like to thank 
the interpreters, without whom the symposium would not have 
been possible. 
Finally, I would thank all of you who attended the symposium 
which, I think, has been genuinely interesting and useful. On this 
note, I call on Jacques Delors. 

From left to right: Jacques DELORS, Pierre URI and Mrs Marianne 
SARRADET-MONNET. 
CLOSURE OF SYMPOSIUM 
BY MR JACQUES DELORS 
President of the Commission 
of the European Communities 
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The European Commission felt that it should do something in its 
own way to remember Jean Monnet on the centenary of his birth. 
Side by side with the magnificent ceremonies such as the one held 
yesterday, 1 and those, more modest but just as moving, which 
have been taking place throughout the year, I personally felt that 
the best way of recalling Monnet, of keeping his memory alive, 
was to look at two aspects of his work. I say two aspects, because 
we must never forget the others: Monnet's contribution during 
two world wars, his work at the League of Nations and the highly 
original step of setting up the Planning Commissariat, which until 
1965-66 was an institution without parallel, deserving, in my view, 
of closer study by specialists in political and administrative 
science. 
We therefore picked two topics for today's gathering: the Monnet 
method and the Action Committee for Europe. 
1 Jean Monnet's ashes were transferred to the Pantheon on 9 November 1988. 
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Why the Monnet method? Because we felt that, although Monnet 
himself was unique, his method could still be an inspiration to us, 
had indeed inspired a number of us, even though the context has 
changed in two essential respects. 
To begin with, if Monnet were 62 today, the age at which he 
started to express his views on Europe, and if he were working in 
a Community institution, he would be faced with an enormous 
management task. There will certainly be men in the future who 
will sweep such tasks aside to bring forward new ideas but, for 
the time being, management of the common policies, the policies 
on competition, the budget, cooperation and development, is the 
cornerstone of the European venture. That is one difference 
between the 1950s and the 1980s. 
The second difference, as Etienne Davignon pointed out so aptly 
this morning, is that if we are to persuade those who govern, we 
must first persuade those who have to listen to them. 
These, I think, are two fairly significant changes. Even so, the 
method is still valid, and that is what I should like to illustrate to 
you this evening. Since those bright young sparks Karl Carstens, 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Max Kohnstamm have talked to us 
only about the future, I cannot confine myself to talking to you 
merely about the past. I will therefore try to mix past, present and 
future. 
As for the second topic, the Action Committee for Europe, I 
think I speak for all my colleagues in the Commission when I say 
that we feel the need of an Action Committee capable, as in the 
past, of influencing politicians both in opposition and in govern-
ment. We feel the need of a broad European movement, with new 
blood at the top, capable of feeding its ideas through to the 
younger generation, of doing what we are incapable of doing as 
an institution (perhaps I should say what I am incapable of doing, 
to avoid committing you), namely moving on from the Europe of 
necessity to the Europe of the ideals and the heart. Had I not 
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been reappointed to head the Commission, I think I would have 
made that my full-time job. I would have enlisted in the ranks of 
the Action Committee and taken my orders from General Cha-
ban-Delmas. I would have gone to all the universities, all the top 
professional training colleges, where the knowledge is already 
there, not to sow the seeds of a European government but to lay 
the foundations of a European movement. 
I think that the Action Committee would do well to ponder the 
questions put by Pascal Fontaine. How are you going to get 
today's politicians involved? How are you going to get the trade 
unions and the employers to talk to each other, given that 
ideology-and I mean ideology in the pejorative sense of the 
term-has once more monopolized the social dialogue, despite the 
efforts we have been making, despite the efforts I have been 
making myself? How will you use the media? And, to conclude, 
Pascal Fontaine gave you a number of major topics to think 
about. 
If we are to build a bridge between the past, the present and the 
future, I think we must take as our starting point two simple, 
rather aggressive ideas, two working hypotheses. The first is that 
we are in a pre-crisis climate. After four years of breathing fresh 
life into the European venture and of sorting out the marriage 
contracts, we can sense another crisis looming. The question a lot 
of people are asking is: should we find a way of averting this 
crisis? Or should we meet it head on, remembering that Monnet 
himself used to say that it was in periods of crisis that you broke 
with routine and could simplify the problem and the solution at 
one go? There has been a lot of talk since a certain speech was 
delivered in Bruges. But there are many other factors, believe me, 
which do nothing to raise the spirits of those whose daily task it is 
to press for progress in opening up public procurement, aligning 
tax systems, introducing the European company and stepping up 
technological cooperation. One has the feeling that the Single Act 
is forcing governments to adjust their attitudes to such a degree 
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that they sometimes lose sight of the common interest and are 
tempted, like condemned men, to ask for more time. 
There is another question which is just as serious: what happens 
after 1992? This is something we should be thinking about today. 
Even if we manage to head off the crisis, we must think about 
what is to happen after 1992. Even if we refuse to think about it, 
others-Austria, Turkey and Morocco-are knocking at the 
door. And not just for commercial or economic reasons. When 
you analyse what is going on in some of these countries-let me 
add some others, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Algeria-you say to 
yourself: do Europeans have any sense of the universal other than 
in novels or films, now fewer and fewer in number with the 
colonization of Europe's television channels by American prod-
ucts? Where they still have an outlet for expressing themselves, 
they wear us out with talk of their yearning for the universal. And 
yet the universal is right there, on their own doorstep. Unless they 
get to grips with this problem by 1995, by the year 2000, 
something will happen. If there are 100 million people in North 
Africa, and 80 million in Turkey, if the liberation process in the 
Eastern-bloc countries runs into serious difficulties, Europe will 
be in demand. It cannot remain in its cocoon forever. 
One last fact to set you thinking: after Reykjavik, the first 
meeting between Mr Reagan and Mr Gorbachev, I asked, in my 
capacity as President of the Commission, for a special European 
Council to talk about East-West relations and how they might 
develop. The answer I got was that this was not in the Treaty. A 
wrong answer, I am sorry to say, because the Treaty contains 
ample justification for convening a European Council on these 
issues. And where are we 18 months later? I don't want to be 
pessimistic-although pessimism can be a stimulus-but there is 
no getting away from the fact that the Twelve have failed to 
produce a document setting out a common view on East-West 
relations or put forward a single proposal for making Europe 
anything other than the stake being gambled for. Obviously, if the 
diplomats representing our countries at the Vienna Conference on 
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Security and Cooperation in Europe were here today, they would 
say that they are working on all kinds of things. But nobody is 
aware of this; only a tiny circle of people are involved. What it 
needs is a breath of fresh air, some new ideas. What we can all see 
is that the Community is not represented. That then is the 
situation today. Do we want to talk about foreign policy? This is 
the factual background against which I should like to give you my 
answer. 
First of all-and this would have been the nub of my remarks if 
the symposium had remained purely academic-though fervour is 
the midwife of the future-I would have wanted to tell you how 
impressed I was by the fact that Jean Monnet, during his first 
experience in the European sphere, working on the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, put his 
finger on the major institutional and political problems which 
were to dictate Europe's future, and still dictate it today. I think it 
is very important that we should remember this. And his way of 
looking at things was not hidebound by dogma. He was propos-
ing something that was quite extraordinary at the time: coal and 
steel were enormously important symbols. Bear in mind the 
situation that Germany and France were in. 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas will certainly remember the debate that 
went on within the French Government on reparations, the Ruhr 
and so forth. Since his League of Nations days, Monnet had had 
the idea-which he had already tried to sell to Poincare-that 
nations are equal. Another way of putting it would be: 'We have 
to go through the door together, not one in front of the other'. 
He had seen all that. But he went further. From the idea of 
equality between nations as the basis for union, he pushed the 
argument further on two crucial points. 
The first was that the executive must be independent of national 
governments. The Commission of the European Communities, 
which, I have to say, has fewer powers than the High Authority 
of the Coal and Steel Community, is in the same spirit. It is a bit 
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like the Planning Commissariat in its heyday, or like Monnet 
himself, since the power the Commission has is minimal com-
pared to the power it can acquire through exercising its influence, 
putting forward proposals of quality and working soberly and 
seriously. But that said, we do have the independence vital to the 
executive. The genius, the originality of the thinking of the fathers 
of the Treaty of Rome-and let us not forget those who took the 
responsibility of bringing the Treaty into being, be it Adenauer, 
De Gasperi or Spaak-is that the institutional quadrangle formed 
by the Assembly, the Court of Justice, the Council and the 
Commission created a militant, active memory, with powers of 
initiative, which the ordinary intergovernmental organization 
does not have. 
This explains the difference between the workings of the Euro-
pean Community and those of, for example, the OECD. At the 
risk of offending some of you, I would say this explains the 
difference in effectiveness between the Community framework for 
action on research and Eureka. There are institutions which act as 
the bearers of memory, which have the power of recall, which can 
be motivated by considerations of what is right, and which can 
put forward proposals. This was the inspiring battle waged by 
Monnet in the ECSC Treaty, along with the battle for equality. 
The other crucial notion is that the institutions should work 
together rather than be subordinate to one another. Working 
together has generated progress for the future. If the other 
institutions had been completely subordinate to the Council, the 
Community would have slipped back into the intergovernmental 
mould. It is the dialectic between the institutions that makes the 
system precious. Since nobody can win by a knock-out, as you 
would say in a boxing match, we have to cooperate. By cooper-
ating, we seek out that concept constantly advocated by Monnet, 
the common interest. We try to identify it precisely because it is 
not a matter of some people winning and others losing, of a 
powerful country vanquishing weaker ones, of a majority 
triumphing over a minority: it is a matter of finding out what is in 
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the common interest. The remarkable thing is that the increase in 
qualified majority voting has not stopped us identifying the 
common interest. On the contrary, it has helped us pinpoint it 
more rapidly. 
There is a final lesson to be drawn from the ECSC Treaty: it is a 
sectoral treaty, whereas the EEC Treaty is an outline treaty. I 
know that there are those among you who have criticized the 
Single Act, but let me say that one of its great merits is that it has 
introduced an element of precision into what, in the EEC Treaty, 
had become too vague and blurred both as regards institutional 
matters and objectives. As the EEC Treaty was put into effect 
and as the Community expanded to include countries which had 
not been involved in the drafting, the objectives became less clear 
and the working of the institutions more hesitant. The good thing 
about the Single Act is that it has focused and expanded on the 
idea of the Community of law, the rules of the game and the aims 
to be achieved. I think that Monnet himself, in the ECSC Treaty, 
was well aware of this distinction between a sectoral treaty with a 
precise, limited objective and an outline treaty. 
What was I getting at when I referred just now to cooperation 
between the institutions and the independence of the excecutive? 
Firstly, implementation of the Single Act and, secondly, the need 
to improve the workings of the institutions. 
As regards implementation of the Single Act, it is not so much a 
question of the difficulties this or that State may face in putting a 
particular action into effect as of the vital interdependence of the 
objectives pursued. This is what a number of Heads of Govern-
ment have failed to realize. Six interrelated objectives are 
enshrined in the Single Act. It is true that one-creation of a 
single European market-has been the template for revival. But 
there are six objectives: 
- creation of a single European market; 
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- economic and social cohesion~ in other words solidarity 
between the rich regions and the less well off or less fortu-
nate; 
- technological and scientific cooperation. I would say in pass-
ing that there are obstacles too. We devote as much money as 
the United States and Japan to research; we have almost as 
many researchers as they do; but because of the obstacles we 
come up against, invisible obstacles ranging from the arro-
gance of Research Ministers to the tightfistedness of Finance 
Ministers, we never get round to working together and 
making the most of our human resources and innovative 
skills; 
then comes increased monetary cooperation. Incidentally, an 
important step forward, more important than people think, 
was taken with the Basle and Nyborg agreements. Since those 
agreements were reached, the European Monetary System has 
withstood a fall in the dollar, something which it failed to do 
in January 1987, leading to the saddest meeting of Finance 
Ministers I have ever had to attend; 
- next we have the social dimension. This simply reflects our 
concern that the model of society which each country has 
created within its own borders should not be ignored at 
European level. The local model is being disputed in Britain at 
present. No one is stopping the British from discussing this 
among themselves. But they cannot~ in the name of their 
internal difficulties, compel others to abandon what is 
regarded as a vital necessity in Europe, the possibility of 
helping the least fortunate and the most disadvantaged 
through a system of collective social welfare. There can be no 
question of that. That is what the social dimension is all 
about. And it was in danger of falling by the wayside as we 
embarked on the road of Europe-wide competition, with the 
risk of social dumping clear for all to see; 
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- last but not least comes environmental action. We admit that 
this has been the slowest to take off. It is a tricky one to 
handle because it is difficult for 12 countries to cooperate and 
yet we must cooperate as 12. 
Contrary to what some people believe, these six objectives are not 
the brainchild of the Commission, still less of 'Red' Jacques 
Delors. They are there in the Treaty; they are there in the Single 
Act. And it is the firm belief of many, particularly the Greeks, 
Spanish, Portuguese, Italians and Irish, that unless these six 
objectives are achieved at the same time there will be no single 
European market with all its promise and potential. That is the 
fact of the matter. 
Implementation of the Single Act highlights the need for this de 
facto interdependence of objectives; it is not wishful thinking or 
someone's hobby horse or a bee in the Commission's bonnet. 
Implementation of the Single Act also demonstrates the need for 
improvements on the institutional front. I would like to make it 
quite clear that the concerns I voiced in the European Parliament 
on the Commission's behalf related to the need for more openness 
in Community affairs. If the proposals considered by the Com-
munity and the decisions it takes are not part and parcel of public 
life and do not concern national parliaments as much as they 
should, we are bound to fail. 
This is where the first democratic deficit lies. The topics we are 
discussing here today are only of interest to a select few. There 
has been a poll which shows that only 7°/o of Europeans have 
ever heard of Jean Monnet. My guess would be that not more 
than 7°/o of Europeans know what we are talking about in the 
Community today. 
The conclusion is obvious. We must arouse public interest by 
being open and by getting people talking about European prob-
lems. This is even more important than producing a treaty 
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tomorrow giving new powers to the European Parliament. I am 
being straight with you when I say that this is the real issue. 
When a Head of Government or a Minister goes back home 
flexing his muscles like Rambo and says 'I won at the Council last 
night', things have come to a pretty pass, because the fact is that 
the Twelve, even the strongest, will win together or lose together. 
Politics must be given a European dimension. 
The reason I went and talked to the Trades Union Congress is 
perhaps that I had been saying to them for a year: 'I am not 
asking you to support my vision of Europe. But can the British 
trade unions, from a position of relative weakness, afford to 
disregard the European dimension in what they think and do?'. 
The answer is no, as they eventually realized. 
These, then, are the points that the Single Act throws into relief. 
It is from this starting point that we must think about what is to 
happen after 1992 and pass the baton to the Action Committee. I 
would like to raise two questions in this connection: 
- First, if Monnet were here today, what would he think of the 
theory that selecting a course of action and setting an 
objective calls for a further action which in turn calls for 
another objective? Would it still apply? I have only one 
answer to that question. Supposing that next year, starting 
from the report to be tabled by the ad hoc Committee, the 12 
Governments were to agree on the shape of economic and 
monetary union and decide to take the first step in 1 July 
1990-in other words, when all restrictions on capital move-
ments are to be lifted in eight countries. If they were to do 
that, I believe there would be, if you will pardon the expres-
sion, a second tiger in the tank of European integration. There 
would be the Single Act, but there would be economic and 
monetary union too. That would be a considerable step 
forward. 
What does economic and monetary union mean? It means 
that there will be an economic decision-making centre to 
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which the governments will have to transfer part, not of their 
sovereignty, but of the constraints they impose on themselves, 
in exchange for a policy of growth against a background of 
stability. This is something quite new. It means transferring 
constraints, not reponsibilities. Anything else would be unreal-
istic. It would be impossible to proclaim tomorrow that we are 
going to transfer 80o/o of the national budgets to the economic 
decision-making centre. Each country, though, could act as its 
own wisdom dictates, subject to a network of constraints. 
These constraints must become a common burden; by cooper-
ating with one another, we must convert them into an extra 
margin for manoeuvre. The economic decision-making centre 
will deal with this; let's go no further than that for the 
moment. 
There would also be a monetary decision-making centre which 
would run Europe's central banks; but at a higher level, there 
would be a central bank for the central banks. What minimal 
resources would such a central bank need to allow it to 
regulate the whole structure? Put like that, the problem seems 
capable of solution. If, on the other hand, we were to say that 
what is involved is a transfer of sovereignty designed to raze 
Westminster to the ground or prevent the 12 Finance Minis-
ters dismally chewing over the idiocies of their government 
colleagues, that would be revolutionary. 
- The second point is that the world moves a lot faster than we 
do, even when things are going well as they are now. This 
brings me back to the question I raised a moment ago: the 
choice between enlargement and internal development. Clearly 
the Commission has given some thought to this problem and 
has opted for concrete, practical reasons, for internal develop-
ment. The fact of the matter is that we simply cannot cope 
with another enlargement. Europe is a little like modern 
couples. It gets married before getting engaged. That is what 
we have been doing since 1972, getting married before getting 
engaged, and we need a bit of time after that to get used to 
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each other. So what we say is: internal development first, then 
enlargement! 
But history will not wait. What are we to do if sometime in 
the near future Austria asks to join? I hear talk of a Europe 
stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, as we used to in the 
1960s. Isn't there a risk here of watering things down? What 
are we going to do? Although much remains to be done to 
reach our 1992 deadline, we must take time out to ask 
ourselves what we are doing about our neighbours, be it the 
EFTA countries; the countries of Eastern Europe; 'the 
orphans', the countries which don't belong to any organiza-
tion, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Malta; or the Maghreb. 
These are the questions which we must ask ourselves here and 
now. This is where we cruelly miss a Jean Monnet. I find even 
listing these problems discouraging, but he, on one of his long 
country walks, would already have summed them up into a 
single question and would have tried to find a solution to it. 
Obviously, as Pierre Uri said, it is the solution that has to be 
simple. 
Our Heads of Government must stop taking this problem lightly. 
There is a trendy idea around of going beyond the Community of 
Twelve. It reminds me of Woody Allen saying: 'The answer's 
yes-what was the question?'. As I see it we must look at the 
problem from a different angle and ask ourselves: 
- how can we fortify the Community so that it goes on being a 
channel for the common interest, ringed about by attendant 
rights which emancipate and protect us? 
- how at the same time, can we extend a helping hand to others, 
so that we remain true to the traditions and the culture of 
Europe? 
These are daunting questions because they are simple, the kind of 
questions Jean Monnet liked. 
II 
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Extracts from his writings 1 
To tell the truth, I have never really believed that history repeats 
itself, and when I have found myself facing a crisis that calls for 
urgent efforts to achieve unity I have had neither the time nor the 
need to refer back to what I have done in the past. But, at 
different times, similar situations have produced in me similar 
reactions, which are naturally expressed in similar ways: 'Unity of 
views and actions', 'overall plan', 'the pooling of resources'. 
* 
* * 
For a statesman, the permanent long-term aim at any time is to 
be in government-and to be at its head. This endeavour is bound 
up with a certain way of presenting things, which often counts as 
much as, or even more than, the things themselves. In the end, 
everything revolves around the struggle for power; and the 
problem to be solved, which is the purpose of power, is forgotten. 
I have never met a great statesman who was not self-centred, and 
1 See 101 Keys to Action, published by the Association des Amis de Jean Monnet, 75 avenue 
Mozart, 75016 Paris. 
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for very good reason: if he were otherwise, he would not have 
made his mark. I could not have done it-not that I am modest: 
simply, that one cannot concentrate on an objective and on 
oneself at the same time. For me, that objective has always been 
the same: to persuade men to work together; to show them that 
beyond their differences of opinion, and despite whatever fron-
tiers divide them, they have a common interest. 
* 
* * 
It may not always be wise to tell everything to everyone but it is 
essential to tell everyone the same thing. That is the only way to 
win trust; and without trust I have never obtained anything-
indeed, I have never tried. 
* 
* * 
How to win confidence was not something I learned from my 
contacts with the Chinese, but I found it very helpful in dealing 
with them. The secret was simple: act as you speak, so that there 
is never any contradiction between what you say and what you 
do. I believe that the same is true in dealing with any people, 
despite what the artful may say-and China is the last place 
anyone should try to be artful. Once you have inspired confidence 
and established good personal relations, which is essential, then 
everything becomes simple and there are no misunderstandings. 
* 
* * 
Anyone's authority is precarious if he wields it only in his own 
name. People do not willingly follow an individual: even if they 
are unaware of it, the prestige they respect in him is that of the 
organized power of legitimate authority for which he stands. 
Forgetting this, many people have found themselves isolated and 
powerless. 
* 
* * 
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Institutions are greater than men. But only men, when they 
possess the strength, can change and enrich things, which the 
institutions then hand on to successive generations. 
* 
* * 
"Where there is no VlSlon, the people perish.' I have always 
believed in this saying of Roosevelt's. 
* 
* * 
People only accept change when they are faced with necessity, 
and only recognize necessity when crisis is upon them. 
* 
* * 
In 1950, fear was engendering paralysis, and paralysis was leading 
to disaster. It was vital to break the deadlock. (At the time I 
wrote:) "The course of events must be altered. To do this, men's 
attitudes must be changed. Words are not enough. Only imme-
diate action on an essential point can change the present static 
situation. This action must be radical, real, immediate, and 
dramatic; it must change things and make a reality of the hopes 
which people are on the point of giving up'. 
* 
* * 
It is often useless to make a frontal attack on problems, since they 
have not arisen by themselves, but are the product of circum-
stances. Only by modifying the circumstances can one disperse the 
difficulties that they create. So, instead of wearing myself out on 
the hard core of resistance, I became accustomed to seeking out 
and trying to change whatever element in its environment was 
causing the block. Sometimes it was quite a minor point, and very 
often a matter of psychology. 
* 
* * 
Men are essential to change but institutions are vital to see it 
through. 
* 
* * 
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The governments of our countries, now as in the past, are called 
upon to defend a certain conception of the national interest. This 
conception is the result of a number of influences, among which 
the most conservative carry the greatest weight. However far-
sighted they may be, governments always find it difficult~ and 
very often impossible, to change the existing state of affairs which 
it is their duty to administer. In their hearts they may wish to do 
so; but they have to account for their actions to Parliament, and 
they are held back by their officials, who want to keep everything 
just so. All this is very natural. If governments and civil services 
were always ready to change the existing order of things from one 
moment to the next, the result would be continual revolution and 
incessant disorder. I know from experience that change can only 
come from outside, under the pressure of necessity, although not 
necessarily by violent means. 
* 
* * 
Statesmen are concerned to do good, and above all, to extricate 
themselves from awkward corners; but they do not always have 
either the taste or the time for using their imagination. They are 
open to creative ideas, and anyone who knows how to present 
such ideas has a good chance of having them accepted. 
* 
* * 
Men who are placed in new practical circumstances, or subjected 
to a new set of obligations, adapt their behaviour and become 
different. If the new context is better, they themselves become 
better: that is the whole rationale of the European Community, 
and the process of civilization itself. 
* 
* * 
To persuade people to talk together is the most one can do to 
serve the cause of peace. But for this a number of conditions must 
be fulfilled, all equally important. One is that the talks be 
conducted in a spirit of equality, and that no one should come to 
the table with the desire to score off somebody else. That means 
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abandoning the supposed privileges of sovereignty and the sharp 
weapon of the veto. The second condition is that everyone should 
talk about the same thing; the third, finally, is that everyone 
should seek the interest which is common to them all. This 
method does not come naturally to people who meet to deal with 
problems that have arisen precisely because of the conflicting 
interests of nation-States. They have to be induced to understand 
the method and apply it. Experience has taught me that for this 
purpose goodwill is not enough, and that a certain moral power 
has to be imposed on everyone-the power of rules laid down by 
common institutions which are greater than individuals and are 
respected by States. Those institutions are designed to promote 
unity-complete unity where there is likeness, and harmony 
where differences still exist. 
* 
* * 
Experience has taught me that no one can claim to understand 
other people's problems unless he can be sure that they are using 
the same words in the same sense as himself. For that reason, I 
have always come back to the same method-getting people to sit 
round the table together. 
* 
* * 
What I sought from my colleagues was fidelity rather than 
obedience. Whether I myself have ever obeyed anyone, I could 
not say: I know no other rule than that of being convinced and 
convincing others. No one has ever succeeded in making me do 
anything which I did not think desirable and useful, and in this 
sense I have never served a master-but I in turn have rarely 
obliged anyone to act against his will. No good ever comes of 
that: it is better to hand the task over to somebody else, or to 
perform it oneself. 
* 
* * 
I am not proposing recipes: I have none to offer. People act or 
fail to act, naturally, according to whether they are all of a piece 
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or a medley of conflicting elements. I am sure to disappoint 
anyone who is looking for more elaborate lessons in the art of 
persuasion. I will only add that, when I have failed, it was less 
often because people were naturally narrow-minded than because 
their minds were deliberately closed. This was the case with many 
senior civil servants, handicapped by loyalty to their national 
system. 
* 
* * 
'We are here to undertake a common task-not to negotiate for 
our own national advantage, but to seek it in the advantage of 
all.' The 60 delegates present were not to know that for more than 
10 months they would go on hearing me repeat this same lesson, 
which men trained to defend and advance purely national inter-
ests find one of the hardest to learn. 'Only if we eliminate from 
our debates any particularist feelings shall we reach a solution. In 
so far as we, gathered here, can change our methods, the attitude 
of all Europeans will likewise gradually change.' 
* 
* * 
Without a doubt, the selfishness of men and of nations is most 
often caused by inadequate understanding of the problem in 
hand, each tending to see only that aspect of it which affects his 
immediate interests. But if each interested party in these circum-
stances, instead of facing another party with opposing interests, is 
presented with the problem as a whole, there can be no doubt 
that all parties' points of view will be modified. Together, they 
will reach a solution that is fair. They will do so all the more 
readily if they know that the debate is taking place under the eyes 
of other governments or peoples who will pass judgment on what 
they do. 
* 
* * 
Everything always takes longer than one expects-which is why 
one must never set time-limits for succeeding. Admittedly, I have 
often talked in terms of deadlines, and on more than one occasion 
I have drawn up a timetable for action because, to work toward 
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the same end and with the right priorities, everyone must know 
his objective and work at the right pace. But on many occasions, 
too, I have adapted my plans to changing circumstances. 
* 
* * 
There are no limits ... to the attention which must be paid to the 
work in hand if it is to succeed. No one should be surprised, or 
complain, at having failed in ventures carried on concurrently, 
with only partial care devoted to any one of them. I have never 
done well at anything to which I have given divided attention; but 
I admit that it is not easy to tackle only one thing, or rather only 
one thing at a time. Politics, in particular, does not lend itself to 
such an approach; so I have not lent myself to politics. 
* 
* * 
When anyone has settled on the objective to be attained, he must 
act without forming hypotheses about the risks of failure. Until 
you have tried, you can never tell whether a task is impossible or 
not. 
* 
* * 
Things have their own rhythm, and one can never spend too long 
on a job if by taking a little more time once can do it better. 
* 
* * 
At the Modernization Plan and at the ECSC our team was 
small-too small, it might seem, to do what was expected of it. In 
fact, however, it was perfectly suited to its task, which was to 
persuade innumerable departments to bring out from their files 
the technical information that was essential to political action. I 
knew from experience that the information was always some-
where to be found, but that is was shrouded in mystery by its 
custodians, who used all their ingenuity to make it incomprehen-
sible. Authority alone is never enough to dig out information. 
Before it can start to circulate, the practical psychological condi-
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tions must be established; and the only way to do that is to ensure 
that those who know and those who decide -those who have all 
the figures and those who need only round totals-speak the 
same language. Persuading technical experts to divulge their 
secrets is so difficult that I can well understand why some men in 
government give it up as a bad job and act in ignorance of the 
real situation. This is why so many mistakes are made in perfectly 
good faith, but in serious situations, where mistakes can be fatal, 
it is inconceivable to me that action should be thwarted by 
misunderstandings about a few basic and decisive facts, such as 
what resources are needed and what may be available. This is the 
point at which I have often intervened, to propose to men in 
power a simple method which they generally accept because they 
are glad to be offered a way out-and to enjoy the benefit. 
* 
* * 
Incompleteness is part of nature, and it needs great art, or great 
wisdom, to know when to lay down the brush, or bring to an end 
any form of action. We should always avoid perfectionism. 
* 
* * 
Nothing is really completed; it takes talent to know at what point 
further effort will spoil the result. 
* 
* * 
The best contribution one can make to civilization is to allow 
men to develop their potential within communities freely chosen 
and built. But to achieve this, one must concentrate on the 
objective and not expect anything of others, except that they may 
rally round when they see that one's determination is as firm as a 
rock. With the Coal and Steel Community, this was to be put to 
the test. 
* 
* * 
The greatest danger in Europe is a diminishing of the individual, 
unable to enhance his daily life, his security, with the resources 
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that progress would bring because the conditions in which we are 
living, the conditions in which the countries of Europe are living, 
stand in the way. 
* 
* * 
The people of Europe are no less intelligent, no less inventive, no 
less industrious, and they have proved it time and time again. But 
they are hemmed in, they are producing for compartmentalized 
markets. By contrast, the countries which have progressed by 
leaps and bounds have big spaces and vast markets. 
* 
* * 
Unless they learn to keep pace with the times, the people of 
Europe will become introspective and incapable, either for their 
own happiness or for civilization in general, of making the 
contribution they have made in the past and could make once 
again. 
* * * 
It is terrifying to look back at the catastrophes that the people of 
Europe have brought upon themselves over the last two centuries: 
simply because everyone pursued his destiny, or what he believed 
to be his destiny, applying his own rules. 
* 
* * 
One of the major causes of weakness in the continental countries 
is not merely their division but the facility with which they 
prejudice the functioning of their institutions. 
* 
* * 
It is institutions which govern relationships between men; they are 
the true cornerstones of civilization. 
* 
* * 
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The creation of a big internal market is essential to enable 
Europeans to recover their place and to play their part in the 
progress of the free world. 
* 
* * 
Between individual countries, gains are confined to the results of 
each country's isolated effort, to the marches it steals on its 
neighbours, to the problems it manages to off-load on to them. In 
the Community, each country gains from the prosperity of the 
whole. 
* 
* * 
A common market cannot be achieved overnight and measures 
on trade liberalization or currency convertibility are not enough. 
The advantages accruing from the common market cannot be 
fully developed until the market is seen to be permanent. No 
country can abandon protectionism until it is sure that the others 
are abandoning protectionism and discrimination too. We need 
common rules and we need to see to it that they are applied. 
* 
* * 
Human nature may not change but human behaviour is dictated 
by institutions and economic conditions. If the advantages of a 
large market are to be secured and relations between nations 
transformed, we need common institutions. 
* 
* * 
A united Europe could concentrate on developing its resources. 
This would enable it to meet the needs of its citizens and shoulder 
its share of the defence burden without relying on the United 
States. 
* 
* * 
The unification of Europe will bring far more than security and 
peace. Europe is the mainspring of the progress which has 
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brought benefits to all of us. Today's Europeans, like previous 
generations of Europeans, are capable of making a contribution 
to the development of civilization. But if their creative genius is to 
blossom again, we need to unite. 
* 
* * 
The union of Europe cannot be based on goodwill alone. Rules 
are needed. The tragic events we have lived through and are still 
witnessing may have made us wiser. But men pass away; others 
will take our place. We cannot bequeath them our personal 
experience. That will die with us. But we can leave them 
institutions. The life of institutions is longer than that of men: if 
they are well built, they can accumulate and hand on the wisdom 
of successive generations. ; 
* 
* * 
Gradually to create among Europeans the broadest common 
interest, served by common democratic institutions to which the 
necessary sovereignty has been delegated: this is the dynamic that 
has never ceased to operate, removing prejudice, doing away with 
frontiers, enlarging to continental scale, within a few years, the 
process that took centuries to form our ancient nations. 
* 
* * 
The world is facing the same risks of self-destruction by division 
as the nations of Europe on a smaller scale. But the modern 
world, like Europe in the past, can find peace and unity by 
overcoming these divisions. I believe that the pace of progress will 
gradually prompt other countries to seek unity, so that their 
people can enjoy the benefits of modern technology. 
* 
* * 
Peace is not just a matter of treaties and undertakings. It depends 
essentially on the creation of conditions, which, although they will 
never change human nature, give a peaceful direction to human 
relationships. This is one of the main consequences of that 
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transformation of Europe which is our Community's aim. By 
attaining unity, by renewing Europe's vitality, by creating a new 
and lasting situation, the people of Europe are making a decisive 
contribution to peace. 
* 
* * 
The passing seasons will lead us inevitably towards greater unity; 
and if we fail to organize it for ourselves, democratically, it will be 
thrust upon us by blind force. There is no place any more for 
separate action by our ancient sovereign nations. 
* 
* * 
The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the 
problems of the present. .. And the Community itself is only a 
stage on the way to the organized world of tomorrow. 
ANNEX 
INVITED AUDIENCE 
IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER 

ANNEX 
ABAD DUPERIER Jose Antonio, Brussels 
ABATE Antonino, Brussels 
AERNOUDT Rudy, Brussels 
AFREIXO Lucinda, Brussels 
ALBRECHT Friedrich-Wilhelm, Brussels 
ALEXAKIS George, Brussels 
ALFF Wilhelm, Bremen 
ALLEN Donald W., Brussels 
ALLIA T A Vittoria, Brussels 
ALVAREZ Cuartero Maria Isabel, Brussels 
AMARAL Rui, Rome 
ANDRIESSEN Henrica, Brussels 
ANNECCHINO Nicola, Brussels 
ARESU Antonio, Brussels 
ARNDT Rudi, Frankfurt/Main 
AZEVEDO Rui, Brussels 
BAECK Judith, Brussels 
BAGWELL Sheryle Anne, Sydney 
BALSINHA Fernando, Brussels 
BANGERT Diederik, Brussels 
BARAS Johan, Brussels 
BARENTS Rene, Brussels 
BARON CRESPO Enrique, Madrid 
BASSOLS SOLDEVILA Andres, Brussels 
BASUALDA LEMARCHAND Nathalie, Brussels 
BE Dominique, Brussels 
BEA UM 0 ND Hans-Christian, Brussels 
BECKER Camille, Brussels 
BENDA Fran~ois, Brussels 
BENEVENIA Rossella, Padua 
BENTO SILVA Jorge, Brussels 
BERA UD Rene-Christian, Brussels 
BERNARD Christiane, Brussels 
BERNS Mathias, Brussels 
BERRIGAN John, Brussels 
BERTHELOT Rita, Brussels 
BISCONTIN Franco, Brussels 
BJERAGER Erik, Copenhagen 
BLADBJERG Bjarne, Brussels 
BLANQUART Jean-Claude, Brussels 
BLOCK Barbara, Brussels 
BLOMEFIELD Adam, Brussels 
BOBICHON Jean-Pierre, Brussels 
BOHLE Hermann, Brussels 
139 
140 ANNEX 
BOHN Irene, Brussels 
BOODTS Guido, Brussels 
BOOSS Dierk, Brussels 
BORCHARDT Klaus-Dieter, Brussels 
BORDEAUX-GROULT Pierre, Paris 
BORGES GOMES Alexandre, Brussels 
BOTHOREL Alain, Brussels 
BOURGES-MAUNOURY Michel, Brussels 
BOURRINET Jacques, Aix-en-Provence 
BRAGA GONCALVES DE PINHO Jose Antonio, Oporto 
BRAUN Fernand, Brussels 
BRENTON Anthony R., Brussels 
BRINKHORST Laurens Jan, Brussels 
BRIONES Alonso Juan, Brussels 
BROCHART Patrice, Brussels 
BRUNAGEL Fran~ois, Brussels 
BRU PURON Carlos, Madrid 
BRUYNINCKX Daniel, Brussels 
BRYDE Mogens, Brussels 
BUCHAN David John, Brussels 
BURKE Richard, Dublin 
BURNS Kieran, Brussels 
BUZELAY Alain, Nancy 
BYRNE Anne, Brussels 
CABANILLAS Alonso Pio, Brussels 
CACCIA TO Giuseppe, Brussels 
CAEIROS Antonio, Brussels 
CAGNEY Denis, Brussels 
CALAMIA Pietro, Brussels 
CALDEIRA Antonio Ivo, Madeira 
CALLEJA Crespo Daniel, Brussels 
CAMHIS Marios, Brussels 
CAMPBELL John, Brussels 
CANDELA CASTILLO Fuensanta, Brussels 
CARDOSO Fernando, Brussels 
CARDOSO E CUNHA Antonio Jose Baptista, Brussels 
CARLIN Brendan, Basingstoke 
CARPENTIER Michel, Brussels 
CARRO CASTRILLO Angel, Brussels 
CARSTENS Karl, Bonn 
CARVALHO BRANCO Etiano, Lisbon 
CARVALHO Joao, Brussels 
CARV ALH 0 Sergio, Brussels 
CASHMAN Liam, Brussels 
ANNEX 
CASTELLACI Antonio, Brussels 
CASTRO FREIRE Antonio, Brussels 
CEMBRERO-VAZQUEZ Ignacio, Brussels 
CESARINI Paolo, Brussels 
CHABAN-DELMAS Jacques, Bordeaux 
CHANTERIE Raphael, Waregem 
CHANTRE Jose, Brussels 
CHARPENTIER Jean, Nancy 
CHASTENET Antoine, Paris 
CHA TENET Pierre, Paris 
CHEYSSON Claude, Brussels 
CHOLET Jean-Marc, Orleans 
CHRISTIANE Serge, Brussels 
CHRISTOPHERSEN Henning, Brussels 
CHUFF ART Charles, Brussels 
CICCONE Rita, Brussels 
CIOFFI Enrica, Luxembourg 
CLINTON DAVIS Stanley, Brussels 
COCCHI Giorgio, Brussels 
Lord COCKFIELD Francis Arthur, Brussels 
COLLI CARBO Josep, Brussels 
COLLET Pierre, Brussels 
COLLOW ALD Paul, Luxembourg 
COLOMBO Emilio, Rome 
COLSON Jean-Louis, Brussels 
COMMEAU-YANNOUSSIS Nina, Brussels 
CONCEICAO Isabel, Brussels 
CONTOGEORGIS Georges, Athens 
CONTZEN Jean-Pierre, Brussels 
COOMBS David, Limerick 
COST A Antonio Maria, Brussels 
COST A Maria, Brussels 
COSTACURTA Nadia, Brussels 
COTTA Jose, Brussels 
COZIGOU Gwenole, Brussels 
COURCY-IRELAND David de, Brussels 
CREA Antonino, Brussels 
CUBERO VERMURIE Pascual, Brussels 
CURELL GOTO R Jorge, Brussels 
CUSACK Thomas, Brussels 
CYDZIK Richard Stanislas, Brussels 
CYMBRON Pedro, Brussels 
DA CAMARA Goao, Lisbon 
DA COSTA MARTINS V., Lisbon 
141 
142 ANNEX 
DALGAARD Svenning H., Brussels 
DAMASO DA SILVA Antonio Jose, Lisbon 
DANIS Fran~ois, Brussels 
DANTAS Fernando, Rio de Janeiro 
DA SILVA LOPEZ Antonio, Oporto 
DASSIS George, Brussels 
DAVIGNON Etienne, Brussels 
DE ALMEIDA Isabel, Brussels 
DEBROUWER Jean-Louis, Brussels 
DE BRUUN Johannes A.M., Brussels 
DECKER Manfred, Brussels 
DECLERCQ Willy, Brussels 
DECOMBIS Marcel, Paris 
DEFOSSEZ Gerard, Brussels 
DE HAAN Peter, Brussels 
DEIMEZIS Nikitas, Brussels 
DE KEERSMAEKER P., Brussels 
DE LA CABALLERIA CRUZ Juan, Brussels 
DE LAET Jean-Pierre, Brussels 
DE LA TORRE Clara, Brussels 
D ELBEKE J os, Brussels 
DELGADO SANCHO Luis, Brussels 
DELORS Jacques, Brussels 
DELOUVRIER Paul, Paris 
D ELPRA T Mireille, Brussels 
DE MARTY Jean-Luc, Brussels 
DE MOOR Lucien, Brussels 
DE MOOR R.A., Tilburg 
DEMPSEY Anthony, Brussels 
DE MULENAERE Didier, Brussels 
DENWOOD Andrew, London 
DEPYPERE Stefaan, Brussels 
DERIAT Olivier, Brussels 
DEROOSE Servaas, Brussels 
de SCHOUTHEETE de TERVARENT Philippe, Brussels 
DE SELYS Gerard, Brussels 
DE SMET Patricia, Paris 
DETHOMAS Bruno, Brussels 
DE W AEL Raoul, Brussels 
DIAZ Marquina Esteban, Brussels 
DIAZ-LLANOS Miguiel, Brussels 
DIERX Andriaan, Brussels 
DIXON Joly, Brussels 
DOCHAO Moreno Rafael, Brussels 
ANNEX 
DOERZAPF Jutta, Brussels 
DOHMES Johannes, Brussels 
DONDELINGER Jean, Luxembourg 
DO RAN Patrick, Limerick 
DOS REIS Adelina, Brussels 
DOSS A VI-MESSY Ephrem, Cotonou 
DOUTRELEPONT Carine, Brussels 
DOWLING Pat, Dublin 
DREYER Peter, Brussels 
D RIJBER Berend, Brussels 
DR UYLANS Philippe, Brussels 
DUCHENE Fran~ois, Brighton 
DUFEIL Michel-Eric, Brussels 
DUJARDIN Claude, Brussels 
DUMOULIN Michel, Louvain 
DUQUE DOMINGUEZ Justina F., Valladolid 
DURAND Claire, Brussels 
DURAND Monique, Ottawa 
DURAO DE ARANTES FONSECA Patricia, Lisbon 
DURAO Luis, Brussels 
DURIEUX Luc, Brussels 
DUSSART Yves, Brussels 
ECHAUZ BRIGALDI Diego, Brussels 
EECKHOUT Jean-Claude, Brussels 
EHLERMANN Klaus, Brussels 
EICH Carlo, Brussels 
EL BARDISI Ahmed Metwaly, Cairo 
ELLERKMANN Werner, Brussels 
ERSB0L Niels, Brussels 
EUGENE Jules-Nicolas, Brussels 
F ACCO Lino, Brussels 
F AGES Geraldine, Brussels 
FALLU-BERGER Katherina, Paris 
F AS ELLA Paolo, Brussels 
FERENCZ! Edmond, Brussels 
FERNANDES DE MELO Antonio Jose, Lisbon 
FERNANDEZ MARISCAL Cruz, Brussels 
FITCHEW Geoffrey, Brussels 
FLEMING Richard, Brussels 
FLO RES G U AL Elena, Brussels 
FOCKE Katharina, Bonn 
FONTAINE Fran~ois, Paris 
FONTAINE Pascal, Brussels 
FONTANA RAVA Gian Pietro, Brussels 
143 
144 ANNEX 
FORESI Antonio, Brussels 
FOUARGE Alphonse, Luxembourg 
FRANCHET Yves, Brussels 
FREITAS E SILVA, Lisbon 
FREITAS GONCALVES Jose Antonio, Madeira 
FRONTINI CATTIVELLO Gaspar, Brussels 
GACHOT Rodolphe, Brussels 
GALLAGHER Eamonn, Brussels 
GAL V ANO Fabio, Brussels 
GARCIA AZCARA TE, Brussels 
GARCIA BERCERO Ignacio, Brussels 
GARCIA BURGUES Julio, Brussels 
GARCIA Gil Antonio, Brussels 
GARCIA Josefina, Manila 
GARCIA-PATRON RIVAS Santia, Brussels 
GARDEN Hugo, Brussels 
GASTER Jens, Brussels 
GAUDET Michel, Paris 
GAZZO Emanuele, Brussels 
GERSTENLAUER Hans-Georg, Brussels 
GERTH-WELLMANN Hella, Brussels 
GIBBON Ann, Montreal 
GILLES Jean-Bernard, Paris 
GIRAUD Jean-Guy, Luxembourg 
GLISENTI Giuseppe, Rome 
GLOCKNER Christian, Luxembourg 
GOBEAUX Jean-Marie, Brussels 
GOERG Harald, Stuttgart 
GOMEZ-REINO LECOCQ Santiago, Brussels 
GOODWORTH Adrian, Brussels 
GORMAN Mary, Brussels 
GORMLEY Paul, Brussels 
GRAMAGLIA Giampiero, Brussels 
GRECK Claude, Brussels 
GREEN D., Birmingham 
G REEY Bryan, Brussels 
G RIESMAR Joseph, Brussels 
GUENTHER Mandred, Bonn 
GUEDELHA Isabel, Brussels 
GUST A VSSON Rolf, Brussels 
GUYADER Maurice, Brussels 
HAASE Lothar, Luxembourg 
HALLER Ute, Brussels 
HALLIGAN Brendan, Dublin 
HANEK UYK Daniel, Brussels 
HANNAY Sir David, Brussels 
ANNEX 
HEARD Joyce, Brussels 
HEDLUND-JANY Ewa, Brussels 
HEIKENS Geert, Brussels 
HELLMANN Rainer, Brussels 
HELLWIG Fritz, Bad-Godesberg 
HENRIQUES Pedro, Brussels 
HENTGEN Etienne, Brussels 
HERLIN Martine, Brussels 
HERNANDEZ Martin Gabriela, Brussels 
HERTZ Thomas, Brussels 
HOCEPIED Christian, Brussels 
HOFFMANN Gerhard, Marburg 
HOROVITZ Dan, Brussels 
HORT Peter, Brussels 
HOVGAARD JAKOBSEN Erik, Brussels 
HUNAULT Monique, Paris 
IGLESIAS BUHIGUES Jose Luis, Brussels 
ILLIESCAS ORTIZ Rafael, Seville 
IZARRA AGUADO Jose, Brussels 
JACQUEMIN Alexis, Louvain 
JANSEN Bernhard, Brussels 
JANSEN Martinus, Brussels 
JANSSEN Jean, Brussels 
JONES Christopher, Brussels 
JUGE Jacqueline, Brussels 
JUNG-OLSEN Morten, Brussels 
KABAALIOGLU H., Istanbul 
KERMODE Philip, Brussels 
KHAN Nicholas, Brussels 
KIRCHNER EJ., Colchester 
KIRSCHBAUM Christiane, Brussels 
KLEIN Wolfgang, Brussels 
KNIPPER Isabelle, Brussels 
KOHNSTAMM Max, Brussels 
KOLETSOS Antonios, Brussels 
KOLODZIEJAK Andreas M.M., Posterholt 
KORTLEVEN Jozef, Brussels 
KOUMAKIS Loucas, Brussels 
KREMER Ulrich, Brussels 
KRIEGER Hans-Jorg, Brussels 
KRIENKE Brunhield, Wiesbaden 
KRISTINSSON Kristofer, Brussels 
145 
146 ANNEX 
KURT A Henri, Brussels 
KUSKE Michael, Brussels 
LAISSY Ana, Brussels 
LAMBRECHTS Piet, Brussels 
LAMOUREUX Franc;ois, Brussels 
LAMY Pascal, Brussels 
LANDABURU Eneko, Brussels 
LANGE Bernard, Brussels 
LANGERMANN Ida, Brussels 
LANGLAIS Michel, Brussels 
LARKIN Colm, Brussels 
LARSEN Jakob Esper, Brussels 
LASTENOUSE Jacqueline, Brussels 
LAURENS Jean, Paris 
LEANDRO Jose, Brussels 
LEFRET Corinne, Brussels 
LEGRAS Guy, Brussels 
LEG RAND Camille, Brussels 
LEJEUNE Pascal, Brussels 
LELONG Pierre, Luxembourg 
LEMAN Nicole, Brussels 
LENZARINI Patrizia, Brussels 
LEWIS Alexandre, Brussels 
LEWIS Peter, Brussels 
LEWKOWICZ Joseph, Brussels 
LEYMARIE Jose, Paris 
LE ZUDE, Brussels 
LIAO Xiang Wang, Peking 
LIBEROS, Paris 
LICARI Joseph, Brussels 
LIZCANO COLET Ricardo, Brussels 
LOPES DE PAULA SILVA Margarida Helena, Lisbon 
LOPEZ DOS SANTOS Helena, Brussels 
LOUET Philippe, Brussels 
LOUIS Jean-Victor, Brussels 
LUBELSKI Nadine, Brussels 
L YBEROPOULOS Constantinos, Brussels 
MAC GOWAN Nicholas, Brussels 
MADEIRA DOS SANTOS Victor, Brussels 
MADERO VILLAREJO Cecilio, Brussels 
MAGRO E SILVA DACOSTA Maria Alexandra, Brussels 
MAIER Paul-Alexandre, Brussels 
MALF A TTl Franco-Maria, Rome 
MALHEIRO Afonso, Brussels 
ANNEX 
MALHOTRA J yoti, New Delhi 
MANIATOPOULOS Constantinos, Brussels 
MANNIN Philippe, Paris 
MANNING A.F., Nijmegen 
MANSHOLT Sicco, Wapserveen 
MARESCEAU, Ghent 
MARIN Manuel, Brussels 
MARKOPOULIOTIS Georgios, Brussels 
MARQUES N oemie, Brussels 
MART Marcel, Luxembourg 
MARTIN Gustavo, Brussels 
MARTINO Edoardo, Alexandria 
MARTINS SOUSA BRANCO Antonio Jose, Lisbon 
MARZYS, Brussels 
MASPRONE Alberto, Brussels 
MASUKO Takashi, Tokyo 
MATHEUS Paula Raul, Brussels 
MA TRIAS Leonardo, Brussels 
MA TTIACI Giovanni, Brussels 
MATTIOLI Francesco, Brussels 
MA TUTES Abel, Brussels 
MC CLELLAN Anthony, Brussels 
MC GEORGE Nicholas, Brussels 
MCGOVERN Thomas, Brussels 
MCLELLAND Anna, Brussels 
MEADOWS Graham, Brussels 
MEIER Walter, Brussels 
MELCHIONNI M. Grazzia, Milan 
MERLADET MAZORRA Jose Feli, Brussels 
MERLO Anna Maria, Milan 
MESQUITA DA CUNHA Miguel, Brussels 
MESTRE SANCHIS Leandre, Brussels 
MESTRES BRUGADA Ramon, Brussels 
MIDDELHOEK Andre J., Luxembourg 
MILAS Rene, Brussels 
MILNER Francesco, Brussels 
MINOR Jacqueline, Brussels 
MONDELLO-MALVESTITI Mila, Brussels 
MONTERO Jorge, Brussels 
MONTGOMERY Paul L., Brussels 
MOREAU Jacques, Brussels 
M 0 REIRA Luis, Brussels 
MORENO Carlos M., Luxembourg 
MORENO I TELLO Aurora, Brussels 
147 
148 ANNEX 
MORIN Jackie, Brussels 
MOSAR Nic, Brussels 
MOSSELMANS Herman, Brussels 
MOTTEU Yves, Brussels 
MOURA DA SILVA Maria de Fatima, Lisbon 
MUHR Gerd, Brussels 
MUNOZ GOMEZ Saturnino, Brussels 
MW ALE Jane, Lusaka 
NAGY Peter, Brussels 
NARJES Karl-Heinz, Brussels 
NATAL Alfredo, Lisbon 
NAT ALI Lorenzo, Brussels 
NAZELLE Xavier de, Brussels 
NEWSON Denis, Brussels 
NICHOLAS George, Brussels 
NICOLAS Pierre, Brussels 
NIEMAN P.C., Brussels 
NOEL Emile, San Domenico di Fiesole 
NOIRF ALISE Catherine, Luxembourg 
NOLIN Michel, Brussels 
NONA T Bernard, Brussels 
OFFELE Hartmut, Brussels 
O'KEEFFE Barry, Carlow 
O'KELLY John, Brussels 
O'KENNEDY Michael, Dublin 
OLA-DAVIES George, Lagos 
OLIVES Gonzalo de, Brussels 
O'NEIL Joseph, Brussels 
0 RSELLO Jean-Pierre, Rome 
ORUS BAGUENA Jesus, Brussels 
O'TOOLE Richard, Brussels 
OTTENS Jan, Sterrebeek 
PADERI Lucio, Brussels 
P AES Antonius, Tervueren 
PAGNOSSIN Elisabetta, Geneva 
PALMISCIANO Giuseppe, Brussels 
PANIAGUA GARCIA Jose, Brussels 
PAPADOPOULOS Andreas, Brussels 
PAT AKIA Maria, Brussels 
PAUWELS Leo M.F., Brussels 
PEARSON Patrick, Brussels 
PEDRONI Angelo, Brussels 
PEETERS Marcel, Brussels 
PELLEGRINI LEVEAUX Genevieve, Brussels 
ANNEX 
PELLICER ZAMORA Rafael, Brussels 
PENAS FERRO Pedro Duarte, Alentejo 
PENAS LADO Ernesto, Brussels 
PENDVILLE Robert, Brussels 
PEREIRA Laura, Brussels 
PERNIGE Ingolf, Brussels 
PERTEK Jacques, Paris 
PESSOA E COSTA Jose Pedro, Brussels 
PEUCHOT Raymond, Brussels 
PFLOESCHNER Fred, Brussels 
PICCAROLO Marco, Brussels 
PIJUAN CANADELL Joan Maria, Brussels 
PI LLORENS MONTSERRAT, Brussels 
PISANI Edgard, Paris 
POINCARE Jean-Alain, Paris 
POOR TERMAN Jean, Brussels 
PORTUGAL PEIXOTO RODRIGUES Maria Margarida, Oporto 
PRA T Juan, Brussels 
PRATS MONNE Xavier, Brussels 
PRESA Silvana, Brussels 
PUENTE EGIDO Jose, Madrid 
PUERTO, Madrid 
QUINCE Gary, Brussels 
R~BIER Jacques-Rene, Brussels 
RADLER Albert, Hamburg 
RAMBA UD Christian, Brussels 
RAMIREZ GRANADOS Pedro, Brussels 
RASMUSSEN Hjalte, Copenhagen 
REBOUD Louis, Grenoble 
REDDY Tom, Brussels 
REICHENBACH Horst, Brussels 
REINERT David, Brussels 
REMITS Paul, Brussels 
RENAUDIERE Philippe, Brussels 
RICHARDSON Irmtraut, Brussels 
RIEBEN Henri, Lausanne 
RIEM Arie, Brussels 
RIJNVOS C.J., Rotterdam 
RISTORI Dominique, Brussels 
RIUS-PASCUAL J aume, Brussels 
ROBBERT Tom, Brussels 
RODONDI Giovanni, Brussels 
RODRIGUEZ Maria Blanca, Brussels 
ROE Patrick, Brussels 
ROESGEN Dieter, Brussels 
149 
150 ANNEX 
ROMANINI Claudio, Brussels 
ROSE Michael, Montreal 
ROSEINGRA VE Tomas, Brussels 
ROSTEK Klaus-Hermann, Berlin 
ROUZIER Jean, Brussels 
SA CRIST AN REPRESA Marcos, Valladolid 
SA CRIST AN REPRESA (Mme ), Valladolid 
SAES GOMEZ Ramiro, Brussels 
SANCHIS I Marco Manuel, Brussels 
SANTARELLI Manuel, Brussels 
SANTORO Antonella, Brussels 
SARKAR Amalesh Chandra, Dacca 
SARRADET-MONNET Jean-Louis, Paris 
SARRADET-MONNET Marianne, Paris 
SASSEN E.M.J.A., Brussels 
SATORI Viviane, Brussels 
SAUZE-VANDEVIJVER Nathalie, Brussels 
SA YIN Serif, Brussels 
SCARASCIA-MUGNOZZA Carlo, Rome 
SCHADE-POULSEN P., Brussels 
SCHAEFER Arno, Brussels 
SCHALASH A.L.L., Brussels 
SCHAUB Alexander, Brussels 
SCHA VOIR-IJSSELSTEIN Renate, Brussels 
SCHEIDGES Rudiger, Frankfurt 
SCHEPERS S., Maastricht 
SCHILS Jan, Brussels 
SCHLENKER Hans H., Brussels 
SCHMID HUBER Peter, Brussels 
SCHMIDT Claudia, Brussels 
SCHMIDT Gudrun, Brussels 
SCHON Jean, Brussels 
SCHWABE Klaus, Aachen 
SCHWEITZER Carl, Bonn 
SCHWEITZER Michael, Passau 
SEATTER Alan, Brussels 
SEEFELD Horst, Bretten 
SHALASH Loutfi, Brussels 
SHIMAZAKI Masao, Tokyo 
SILVA BOLINHAS TEIXEIRA Maria Clara, Lisbon 
SLEUWAGEN Leo, Louvain 
SNAEV ARR Arni, Reykjavik 
SOARES PIMENTEL Anabel Marina, Lisbon 
SOLBES MIRA Pedro, Madrid 
ANNEX 
SONNENFELD Gisela, Brussels 
SORMANI Pietro, Brussels 
SPATOLISANO Maria-Francesca, Brussels 
SPIERENBURG Dirk, Wassenaar 
STENSBALLE Klaus, Brussels 
STOKKE Olga, Oslo 
STORIE-PUGH Peter, Brussels 
STOUFFLET Jacques, Brussels 
STRAUS Robert, Brussels 
SUTHERLAND Peter, Brussels 
SYNNEMAR Ingrid, Stockholm 
TEISSEIRE Jean, Brussels 
TEITGEN Pierre-Henri, Paris 
TENREIRO Mario-Paulo, Brussels 
TEUTEMANN Manfred, Brussels 
THEYS Michel, Brussels 
THEMIDO J oao, Brussels 
THURMES Fernand, Brussels 
TINDEMANS Leo, Brussels 
TISON Elisabethe, Brussels 
TITCHEN Hlen, Brussels 
TODD Jonathan, Brussels 
TOLEDANO-LAREDO Armando, Brussels 
TONNET Alain, Brussels 
TRAUSCH Gilbert, Luxembourg 
TROJAN Carlo, Brussels 
TRONCOSO GONZALEZ Guillerm, Brussels 
TURBIAZ Michel, Brussels 
TUTT Nigel, Brussels 
TZANNETAKOS Yannis, Athens 
UKIL Paromita, Calcutta 
ULLER UP J orgen, Copenhagen 
ULUENGIN Hadi, Brussels 
UNDERWOOD Anne, New York 
UNGERER Werner, Brussels 
URI Pierre, Paris 
URRUTIA GARRO Bernardo, Brussels 
USBORNE David James, Brussels 
VALE DE ALMEIDA Joao, Lisbon 
VALERIUS M., Paris 
VALLAS Stergios, Luxembourg 
VAL TAT Cecile, Brussels 
VAN BARLING EN Bertus, Brussels 
VAN CUTSEM Victor, Heverlee 
151 
152 ANNEX 
VANDEN ABEELE Michel, Brussels 
VAN DEN BROUCKE Andre, Brussels 
VAN DEN BROECK Jef, Brussels 
V AND ERHAEGHEN Bernard, Brussels 
VANDER PERRE J., Brussels 
VAN DER WEE Dominique, Brussels 
VAN GERVEN W., Luxembourg 
VAN HECKE-DE GHELLINCK Elisabeth, Brussels 
V ANHEUKELEN Marc, Brussels 
VAN HOOF Marc, Brussels 
VAN HOOF-HAFERKAMP Renee, Brussels 
VAN KRAA Y Frans, Leeds 
VAN RAAN Richard, Brussels 
VAN SAELEN Roland, Brussels 
VAN WINCKEL Els, Brussels 
V ARFIS Grigoris, Brussels 
VAURE Roger, Brussels 
VENTURA Isabella, Brussels 
VERBORGH Jacques, Brussels 
VERHEYDEN Walter, Luxembourg 
VERLEYE Karel J., Damme 
VERROS Constantin, Brussels 
VIANA Laure, Brussels 
VICENTE VILA Patricia, Brussels 
VIEIRA Joao, Brussels 
VIGIER Pierre, Brussels 
VIGNON Jerome, Brussels 
VILA COST A Blanca, Barcelona 
VILA DE BENA VENT Rodrigo, Brussels 
VILAR Rui, Brussels 
VILLASANTE Claudios Jesus 
VILLE Jean-Luis, Brussels 
VINCI Enrico, Luxembourg 
VINOIS Jean-Arnold, Brussels 
VITIELLO Luigi, Brussels 
VLAHAPOULOS Georgios, Brussels 
VLANDAS Sylvie, Brussels 
VLIEBERGH Eric, Brussels 
VON DER GROEBEN Hans, Rheinbach 
WAGENBAUR Rolf, Brussels 
WAGNER Reinhard, Brussels 
WALKER David, Brussels 
W ALLRAPP Ernst, Brussels 
WALSH Kevin, Brussels 
ANNEX 
WEI Wei, Brussels 
WEIAND Helmut, Brussels 
WEINHEIMER Patrick, Brussels 
WERLE Gerd, Luxembourg 
WER Y Leo, Liege 
WESTENDORP Y CABEZA Carlos, Brussels 
WESTON Stephen, Brussels 
WESTPHAL Eric, Paris 
WEYLAND Joseph, Brussels 
WILKINSON Ralph, Brussels 
WILLIAMS Karen, Brussels 
WILLIAMSON David F., Brussels 
WITTERWULGHE Robert, Louvain 
WISSELS Gerard, Brussels 
WOLF Michel, Brussels 
Y AO Noel, Abidjan 
YU Pieqin, Peking 
ZAMARON Bernard, Luxembourg 
ZAPICO LANDROVE Cora, Brussels 
ZIOTTI Paolo, Brussels 
ZIPPEL Wulfdieter, Munich 
ZUR HAUSEN Gotz, Brussels 
153 
European Communities - Commission 
Proceedings of Jean Monnet centenary symposium organized by the Commission of the 
European Communities- Brussels, 10 November 1988 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
1989- 153 p. - 16.2 x 23.0 em 
ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT 
ISBN 92-825-9320-7 
Catalogue number: CB-54-88-223-EN-C 
Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: ECU 3.50 
Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: ECU 3.50 
• * * OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
:!I!: OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
* * * * * L-2985 Luxembourg 
ISBN 92-825-9320-7 
llllllllllllllllllllllll 
9 789282 593202 
